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I. Introduction
On July 7, 2009, Catherina Cenzon-DeCarlo (Cenzon-DeCarlo), a
nurse for Mount Sinai Hospital (the Hospital) in New York, filed a lawsuit
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
alleging that she had been unlawfully compelled to assist in the
performance of a late second trimester abortion over her moral and
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would like to extend my sincere thanks to Prof. Robin Wilson who advised me on this
project and offered helpful critique and guidance throughout; to Patrick Rowe for helping
me polish the many drafts; to my parents for their ceaseless support; and to my wife
Mallory, who provided much needed encouragement while graciously enduring my many
late nights in the library.
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religious objections.1 Mrs. Cenzon-DeCarlo alleged violations of 42 U.S.C.
§ 300a-7(c) (Church Amendment)2 and requested declaratory and injunctive
relief along with compensatory and punitive damages.3 Because the
resolution of Cenzon-DeCarlo’s claim came on a summary judgment
motion brought by the Hospital, ultimately affirmed by the Second Circuit,
this Note addresses the facts as alleged in the complaint.4 The resolution of
Cenzon-DeCarlo’s case exposes a gaping hole in the effectiveness of
federal protections for individuals who object to participating in abortion
procedures on religious, moral, or conscientious grounds.
II. The Facts of the Cenzon-DeCarlo Case
In August of 2004, Catherina Cenzon-DeCarlo began employment at
Mount Sinai Hospital in New York.5 During her initial interviews with the
Hospital, Cenzon-DeCarlo was asked about her willingness to assist in
abortions. She responded that she had objections, based on her religious
views, and would not be comfortable assisting in the abortion of a living
child.6 The hiring officials did not express any concern to Cenzon-DeCarlo
about her position on abortion.7 Indeed the hospital had a written policy
allowing employees to formally object to assisting in abortions without

1. See Complaint at 11–12, 21–22, Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., No. 09
CV 3120(RJD), 2010 WL 169485 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010) (describing the facts
surrounding the hospital’s refusal to honor Cenzon-DeCarlo’s expressed unwillingness to
participate in abortions as well as the alleged violations of law resulting from that event).
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c) (2006) ("No entity [receiving certain federal funding]
may discriminate [against] any physician or other health care personnel . . . because he
refused to . . . assist in the performance of [an abortion] . . . because of his religious beliefs
or moral convictions . . . .").
3. See Complaint, supra note 1, at 1–2 (detailing Cenzon-DeCarlo’s claims including
compensatory and punitive damages for psychological harms resulting from her participation
as well as the request for injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent the hospital from
forcing employees to participate in abortions over their objection).
4. See Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 626 F.3d 695, 699 (2d Cir. 2010)
(affirming the judgment of the district court and holding that 42 U.S.C. 300a-7(c) does not
imply a private right of action); Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 325 (1991)
(setting forth the standard of review for cases rising on a Rule 12(b)(6) summary judgment
motion saying that the Court "must assume the truth of the material facts as alleged in the
complaint").
5. Complaint, supra note 1, at 5.
6. Id. at 6.
7. Id.
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penalty.8 In keeping with this policy, Cenzon-DeCarlo filled out the form
recording her objection.9
Between 2004 and May of 2009, the Hospital abided by the policy and
avoided assigning Cenzon-DeCarlo to abortion cases.10 On one occasion,
she was assigned to an abortion case and later removed after she reminded
her supervisors that she was only willing to assist with miscarriages.11
During an on-call shift on May 24, 2009, Cenzon-DeCarlo was told that she
had been assigned to a dilation and curettage (D&C) procedure which is
commonly performed in the case of miscarriage.12 After examining the
charts in the operation room and observing the instruments being readied,
Cenzon-DeCarlo became concerned that the procedure scheduled was an
abortion.13 After calling the resident assigned to the case, Cenzon-DeCarlo
discovered that the procedure to be performed was actually a secondtrimester abortion at twenty-two weeks of gestation.14 After informing the
resident that she would not participate in the abortion, she contacted her
nursing supervisor and requested to be removed from the case.15 The
supervisor instructed Cenzon-DeCarlo to find out if another nurse could
cover for her and told her that she would contact a senior hospital official to
ask whether she could be excused.16 When the supervisor called her back,
Cenzon-DeCarlo was told that a senior hospital official had insisted that she
assist in the case and had instructed the supervisor not to attempt to seek a
replacement.17
During her efforts to be removed from the case, Cenzon-DeCarlo was
told by her supervisor that the mother could die if the procedure was not
immediately performed.18 This claim contradicted the information she had
received when speaking with the resident in charge of the case who had
8. Id.
9. Id. at 7.
10. See id. at 9 (describing the Hospital’s usual practice of assigning nurses other than
Cenzon-DeCarlo when such cases arose).
11. Id.
12. See id. at 8, 10 (describing the purposes of D&C as a common procedure to
remove a miscarried fetus from the uterus and detailing Cenzon-DeCarlo’s receipt of her
assignment on May 24).
13. Id. at 10.
14. Id. at 11.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 12.
18. Id.
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revealed that the patient was not receiving the treatment that would be
necessary for someone suffering critically from preeclampsia.19
Furthermore, the case was classified as a Category II priority which
required the surgery to be performed within a six hour window.20 This
classification indicated that there was more than adequate time to search for
and find a replacement nurse.21 Although it is not a requirement of the
Church Amendment that there be other individuals willing to assist, it is
worth noting that even the supervisor on duty was qualified and able to
assist in the procedure and could have stepped in without causing any
significant delay.22 Finally, the supervisor told Cenzon-DeCarlo that she
would face charges of insubordination and patient abandonment if she
failed to comply.23
Realizing that such charges could cause her to lose her nursing license
and career, Cenzon-DeCarlo made her last protest by informing her
supervisor that her religious views led her to believe that the procedure
amounted to "killing [] a 22-week-old child" and offered to get her priest on
the phone to verify the sincerity of her belief.24 This offer was rejected and
Cenzon-DeCarlo was forced to assist in and observe the performance of a
second-trimester dilation and evacuation25 abortion described by Cenzon19. See id. (detailing Cenzon-DeCarlo’s conversation with the resident and the
discovery that the patient was not receiving magnesium therapy which is a necessity for a
patient in critical condition suffering from preeclampsia).
20. Compare id. at 14 (describing the priority given to Category II cases), with id.
(discussing the higher priority of Category I patients "requiring immediate surgical
intervention for life or limb threatening conditions").
21. Id.
22. Id. at 12; see also Health Programs Extension Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-45,
§ 401, 87 Stat. 91, 95–96 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (2006)) [hereinafter
Church Amendment] (protecting healthcare workers from discrimination without any
limitations as to the availability of other willing and able participants).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 13.
25. See id. at 8 (describing the dilation and evacuation method of abortion). The
complaint set forth the details of the procedure:
In a dilation and evacuation (D&E) abortion, the mother’s cervix is dilated, and
after sufficient dilation the mother is placed under anesthesia or sedation. The
doctor then inserts grasping forceps through the mother’s cervix and into the
uterus. The doctor grips a part of the preborn child with the forceps and pulls it
back through the cervix and vagina even after meeting resistance from the
cervix. That friction causes the preborn child to tear apart. The process of
evacuating the preborn child piece by piece continues until the child has been
completely removed.
Id. at 8.
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DeCarlo as "the killing of a 22-week-old preborn child by
dismemberment."26 As a part of her duties, she was required to transport
the dismembered fetus to the specimen room.27 As a result, CenzonDeCarlo experienced "extreme emotional, psychological, and spiritual
suffering" including nightmares, loss of sleep, and damage "in her personal
and religious relationships."28 She later had to receive treatment from her
physician to manage the psychological harms.29 In addition, the Hospital
drastically cut the number of her on-call assignments on which she was
financially dependent.30
Prior to filing suit, Cenzon-DeCarlo exhausted the Hospital’s available
complaint procedures. One scheduled meeting to discuss her right to refuse
participation in abortions was cancelled by the Hospital because they
refused to meet with her attorney present.31 On the same day the meeting
was cancelled, Cenzon-DeCarlo was told that her ability to work future oncall shifts depended upon her signing an agreement that she would assist in
performing abortions that the Hospital deemed to be emergencies requiring
her assistance.32 Even after facing intense pressure, Cenzon-DeCarlo
refused to sign the statement and reminded the Hospital of the form she
signed upon employment recognizing her objection to assisting in
abortions.33
After these events, Cenzon-DeCarlo filed suit in the Eastern District of
New York alleging violations of the Church Amendment.34 Mount Sinai
Hospital is subject to the provisions of the Church Amendment by virtue of
their receipt of millions of dollars in Health and Human Services (HHS)
grants authorized by the Public Health Service Act.35 Although the facts
26. Id. at 14.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 15.
29. Id.
30. See id. at 5 (discussing her family’s financial dependence on her work schedule
which, prior to the incident alleged, included eight to nine on-call shifts per month); id. at 16
(saying that for August 2009 the number of her on-call assignments had been reduced from
their prior levels of eight to nine down to one).
31. Id. at 17.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1–2.
35. See Church Amendment, Pub. L. No. 93-45, § 401(c), 87 Stat. 91, 95–96 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7) (showing that receipt of funds authorized by the Public
Health Service Act brings the receiving entity under the anti-discrimination provisions of the
Church Amendment); Complaint, supra note 1, at 18–19 (describing the various grants
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concerning whether the procedure was a true emergency would likely have
been in dispute, the Church Amendment contains no provision containing
any sort of emergency or necessity exception.36 Cenzon-DeCarlo had,
therefore, a persuasive case that her legally protected interests under the
Church Amendment had been violated. The Hospital, however, filed a
motion to dismiss on the basis that the Church Amendment does not
provide for a private right of action to enforce its terms.37 The District
Court, in a decision affirmed by the Second Circuit, agreed with the
Hospital.38 Cenzon-DeCarlo’s claim was, therefore, dismissed.39
The resolution of Cenzon-DeCarlo’s case exposes a potential hole in
federal statutory protections for the conscience rights of workers in the
healthcare industry. This gap is the product of congressional failure to
explicitly provide for private enforcement of conscience laws combined
with a late twentieth century shift in Supreme Court precedent that
fundamentally altered the way federal courts consider the provision of
remedies under federal law.40 The damaging effect of these two factors
falls most directly on litigants, like Cenzon-DeCarlo, who seek protection
under statutes passed just prior to the Supreme Court shift, a time when
Congress had no reason to know that an explicit remedial provision would
later be required by the courts. This suggests that the courts should more
carefully consider the propriety of implying a private remedy under statutes
passed during this transition period rather than applying strict, formalistic
requirements which are appropriate only for statutes passed after the courts
abandoned the remedial approach.41 The Church Amendment, passed prior
to this judicial departure from the remedial role, merits a more

received by the Hospital which trigger the applicability of the Church Amendment).
36. See Complaint, supra note 1, at 21 ("There is no ‘medical necessity’ exception to
section (c) of the Church Amendment."). See generally Church Amendment, § 401(c)
(containing no exceptions for medical necessity or emergency).
37. See Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., No. 09 CV 3120(RJD), 2010 WL
169485, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010), aff’d 626 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2010) ("Defendant
moves for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.").
38. See id. at *4 (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss).
39. Id.
40. See infra notes 71–80 and accompanying text (demonstrating the shift in Court
precedent regarding implication of private remedies under federal law).
41. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 378
(1982) (beginning the Court’s analysis of the propriety of implying a right of action by
saying that it is necessary to consider the state of the law at the time the statute under
question was enacted).
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comprehensive approach to deciding the propriety of implying a private
right of action.
III. The Church Amendment
Responding to fears that Roe v. Wade42 might be used by federal courts
as a justification for requiring individuals and institutions to provide
abortions against their will, Congress passed the Church Amendment which
protects the conscience rights of workers and institutions in the healthcare
industry.43 The Amendment reads:
(b) The receipt of any grant, contract, loan, or loan guarantee under
the Public Health Service Act, the Community Mental Health Centers
Act, or the Developmental Disabilities Services and Facilities
Construction Act by any individual or entity does not authorize any
court or any public official or other public authority to require—
(1) such individual to perform or assist in the performance of
any sterilization procedure or abortion if his performance or
assistance in the performance of such procedure or abortion would
be contrary to his religious beliefs or moral convictions; or
(2) such entity to—
(A) make its facilities available for the performance of
any sterilization procedure or abortion if the performance of
such procedure or abortion in such facilities is prohibited by
the entity on the basis of religious beliefs or moral
convictions, or
(B) provide any personnel for the performance or
assistance in the performance of any sterilization procedure
42. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162–64 (1973) (holding that the right to privacy
includes a woman’s right to obtain a pre-viability abortion).
43. See 119 CONG. REC. 9595 (1973) (statement of Sen. Church) ("Given this state of
the law [resulting from Roe v. Wade], I can well understand the deep concern being
expressed by hospital administrators, clergymen, and physicians whose religious beliefs
prohibit abortions and/or sterilization in most cases."); Suzanne Davis & Paul Lansing,
When Two Fundamental Rights Collide at the Pharmacy: The Struggle to Balance
Consumer’s Rights to Access Contraception and the Pharmacist’s Right of Conscience, 12
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 67, 76 (2009) (explaining that Congress responded to the moral
tension surrounding Roe with the Church Amendment which "made it clear that individuals
or entities [receiving] federal funds or assistance could not be required . . . to perform or
assist in an abortion if contrary to religious beliefs or moral convictions"); 119 CONG. REC. at
9595 (statement of Sen. Church) (expressing concern about the actions of a district court
which had issued a preliminary injunction ordering a Catholic hospital to make its facilities
available for the performance of a sterilization procedure).
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or abortion if the performance or assistance in the
performance of such procedures or abortion by such
personnel would be contrary to the religious beliefs or moral
convictions of such personnel.
(c) No entity which receives a grant, contract, loan, or loan guarantee
under the Public Health Service Act, the Community Mental Health
Centers Act, or the Developmental Disabilities Services and Facilities
Construction Act after June 18, 1973, may—
(1) discriminate in the employment, promotion, or termination
of employment of any physician or other health care personnel, or
(2) discriminate in the extension of staff or other privileges to
any physician or other health care personnel,
because he performed or assisted in the performance of a lawful
sterilization procedure or abortion, because he refused to perform or
assist in the performance of such a procedure or abortion on the grounds
that his performance or assistance in the performance of the procedure
or abortion would be contrary to his religious beliefs or moral
convictions, or because of his religious beliefs or moral convictions
respecting sterilization procedures or abortions.44

The amendment’s protections are seen to be comprehensive. At the
individual level, the statute prohibits any government authority from
requiring participation in abortion or sterilization procedures contrary to
one’s religious or moral convictions, and it further prohibits potential
discrimination against either participating or nonparticipating individuals
by institutions that receive specified federal funding.45 At the entity level,
the amendment prohibits the federal government from requiring entities that
receive designated funds to make their facilities available for abortion or to
provide personnel for such procedures.46
Very little can be gleaned concerning Congress’s intended method of
enforcement from the text of the statute alone.47 Although some suggestion
was made in floor debate that federal funds could be withheld from
noncompliant entities, the legislative history also contains ambiguities
concerning enforcement.48 The Senators debating the amendment cast
44. Health Programs Extension Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-45, § 401, 87 Stat. 91,
95–96 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c) (2006)).
45. Id. § 401(b)(1), (c).
46. Id. § 401(b)(2).
47. See generally id. (making no mention of the enforcement of the Church
Amendment’s anti-discrimination provisions).
48. See 119 CONG. REC. 9604 (statement of Sen. Javits) ("[I]t qualifies the benefit by
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some doubt on the possibility of a funding penalty when Senator Javits,
responding to the question of whether there was a penalty for violations,
said, "I hope so. I do not know if it will be so adjudicated by the
administrator, but it is there."49 However, two other Senators, including
Senator Church who sponsored the amendment, suggested that funds would
not be withheld in the event of noncompliance.50 The Senators never made
mention of private remedies, so very little can be gleaned from the
legislative history to either affirm or negate the possibility of private
enforcement.51 However, every court to consider whether this legislative
history supports a private right of action has responded in the negative.52
Due to the silence of Congress on the question, these findings are hardly
surprising. However, the District of New York, in a decision affirmed by
the Second Circuit, ruled that the Church Amendment not only fails to
provide a private right of action but that it does not confer individual rights
at all.53
IV. The Cenzon-DeCarlo Decision
In its examination of the propriety of implying a private right of action
in the Church Amendment, the Eastern District of New York confined its
inquiry to the issue of legislative intent to either create or deny a private
remedy.54 To make this determination, the court addressed and dismissed
saying that if they do discriminate against the doctor who is in their hospital because he has
done something they do not approve of . . . we have the authority to deprive them of that
benefit.").
49. Id.
50. See id. (Statements of Senators Church and Jackson) (answering questions posed
by Senator Pastore concerning the possibility of a penalty by suggesting that there would be
no funding penalty in the event of noncompliance).
51. See Leora Eisendstadt, Separation of Church and Hospital: Strategies to Protect
Pro-Choice Physicians in Religiously Affiliated Hospitals, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 135,
160 (2003) (suggesting that the legislative history of the Church Amendment "is sparse on
the question of congressional intent with respect to a private right of action").
52. See, e.g., Nead v. Board of Trs. of E. Ill. Univ., No. 05-2137, 2006 WL 1582454,
at *5 (C.D. Ill. June 6, 2006) (dismissing the plaintiff’s Church Amendment claim due to
lack of support from the legislative history for implying a right of action).
53. See Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., No. 09 CV 3120(RJD), 2010 WL
169485, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010), aff’d, 626 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2010) (saying that the
language of the Church Amendment does not support the inference that Congress intended
to create a private right).
54. See id. at *3 ("[T]his Court must examine whether Congress intended to create a
private remedy. If not, ‘a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no
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the plaintiff’s argument that the Church Amendment contained the kind of
"rights-creating language" necessary to support a finding of congressional
intent to create a private remedy.55 The court reasoned that since that the
statute addresses the entities regulated rather than the individuals protected,
no private remedy was intended.56 Ultimately, the court concluded that
neither the language of the statute nor its legislative history suggested that
Congress intended to create a private remedy.57 The court proceeded to
dismiss Cenzon-DeCarlo’s complaint saying that it found "no basis for
implying a private right of action under the Church Amendment."58
By deciding Cenzon-DeCarlo on the grounds that the Church
Amendment did not contain the necessary rights-creating language to
provide evidence that a right of action was intended, the Eastern District of
New York avoided some of the more complicated questions concerning
other methods of proving congressional intent.59 If, for instance, the court
had found the text and structure of the statute to be ambiguous concerning
congressional intent, it might have been pressed to consider other methods
of determining intent such as Congress’s expectations in light of the legal
context in which the statute was passed.60 Rather than independently
examining congressional intent concerning the creation of a private right,
matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute.’"
(citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–87 (2001))).
55. See id. at *4 (setting forth the plaintiff’s argument that the text and structure of 42
U.S.C. § 300a-7(c) support the implication of a private remedy because it contains rightscreating language not present in other similar statutes where the courts have failed to find a
private remedy).
56. See id. ("[T]he Church Amendment lacks the classic individual rights-creating
language of Title VI and Title IX (‘No person . . . shall . . . be subjected to discrimination’)
under which implied private rights of action have been found." (citations omitted)).
57. See id. (saying that the Church Amendment "lacks the focus on individuals"
necessary to infer congressional intent to create a private remedy and that the legislative
history similarly fails to demonstrate such intent).
58. Id.
59. See id. at *3 (stating that statutes which "grant[] no private rights to any
identifiable class" will not be found to contain an implied right of action (quoting Gonzaga
Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283–84 (2002))); id. at *4 (holding that the Church Amendment
fails the test set forth in Gonzaga and that a private right of action, therefore, cannot be
implied).
60. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288 (2001) (stating that contemporary
legal context is relevant where the text is ambiguous as to Congress’s intent to create a
private remedy), see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., v. Curran, 456 U.S.
353, 378 (1982) ("In determining whether a private cause of action is implicit in a federal
statutory scheme . . . the initial focus must be on the state of the law at the time the
legislation was enacted.").
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the court confined its inquiry to a narrow comparison of the text of the
Church Amendment with the text of Titles VI and IX.61 The court then
effectively concluded that the failure of the Church Amendment to mirror
the "classic rights-creating language" of these statutes indicates that no
private right was intended.62
Although the Second Circuit expanded the inquiry beyond a
comparison to the language of Titles VI and IX, it similarly found a lack of
evidence that Congress intended to create a private remedy.63 While
acknowledging the existence of some evidence of congressional intent to
create a private right, the Second Circuit emphasized the distinction
between intent to create a private right and intent to confer a private right of
action.64 The result, according to the Second Circuit, is that "Section 300
may be a statute in which Congress conferred an individual right without an
accompanying right of action."65 Under the Second Circuit’s analysis, it is
unnecessary to determine whether the Church Amendment confers
individual rights because there is not sufficient evidence of congressional
intent to create a right of action to enforce them.
This Note will argue that the district court’s requirement of strict
adherence to the structure of Title VI is an imprecise means of statutory
interpretation that precludes the consideration of other meaningful
indicators of Congress’s intent respecting the Church Amendment.66 It will
advance the argument that the Second Circuit’s analysis, while an
improvement, similarly fails to adequately consider other pertinent sources
61. See Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., No. 09 CV 3120(RJD), 2010 WL
169485, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010) (comparing the text of the Church Amendment to
Title VI and IX’s "no person shall" language and concluding that the Church Amendment
does not similarly indicate intent to confer private rights).
62. See id. ("Plaintiff’s efforts to distinguish the Church Amendment, however, are
unpersuasive. Like FERPA, the Church Amendment lacks the classic individual rightscreating language of Title VI and Title IX (‘No person . . . shall . . . be subjected to
discrimination’) under which implied private rights of action have been found." (citations
omitted)).
63. Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 626 F.3d 695, 698 (2d Cir. 2010) ("While
there may be some colorable evidence of intent to confer or recognize an individual right,
there is no evidence that Congress intended to create a right of action.").
64. See id. ("We are mindful of a more recent instruction from the High Court that
‘[t]he judicial task is to . . . determine whether [a statute] displays an intent to create not just
a private right but also a private remedy.’" (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275,
286 (2001))).
65. Id. at 698–99.
66. See infra notes 193–224 and accompanying text (criticizing the district court’s
treatment of the Church Amendment and setting forth an argument for the propriety of
finding a right of action under the statute).
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of evidence regarding congressional intent. This failure to properly account
for other indicators of congressional intent leaves the Church Amendment
plaintiff wrestling with the troubling notion set forth by the Second
Circuit—that Congress may have intended to create a private right without
an accompanying remedy.67 This Note will argue that such a result is
untenable and that private enforcement is necessary to achieve Congress’s
goal of protecting individuals from discrimination on the basis of their
religious and moral views respecting abortion.68 However, considering the
reluctance of the modern Court to find implied rights of action and the
troubles faced in the courts by Church Amendment plaintiffs thus far, it
may be necessary for Congress to revisit this topic and explicitly provide
for private enforcement in abortion discrimination and coercion cases.
V. The Historical Trend Away from Judicial Implication of
Private Remedies
To understand the Cenzon-DeCarlo decision, it is necessary to
understand the evolution of the federal judiciary’s approach to deciding
implication questions. To the casual observer and particularly to plaintiffs
like Mrs. Cenzon-DeCarlo whose federally protected interests have been
violated, the idea that there may be no means to enforce those protected
interests may be confusing indeed.69 When a court determines that
Congress did not intend for a private remedy to accompany the protections
provided, plaintiffs are left with a frustrating and seemingly odd result. In
some circumstances, these individuals are left without a means to vindicate
their rights.70 Cenzon-DeCarlo, for instance, faces the choice to either
continue working as a nurse with little assurance that she will not again be
67. See Cenzon-DeCarlo, 626 F.3d at 698–99 ("Section 300 may be a statute in which
Congress conferred an individual right without an accompanying right of action.").
68. See infra notes 236–63 and accompanying text (arguing that the effective
implementation of Congress’s oft-expressed prohibition of discriminatory action against
individuals on the basis of their religious or moral views on participating in abortions
depends upon private enforcement).
69. See Susan J. Stabile, The Role of Congressional Intent in Determining the
Existence of Implied Private Rights of Action, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 861, 903 (1996)
("When a person suffers injury at the hands of another person whose injury-causing actions
are in violation of law, our intuitive sense is that the injured party should have a meaningful
remedy.").
70. See id. at 904 (describing the occurrence of events which leave an aggrieved party
without a meaningful remedy and arguing that the courts should be more willing to imply a
cause of action in cases where such an occurrence is likely).

THE CHURCH AMENDMENT

729

faced with coercive or discriminatory measures or else she must look for
alternative employment. To better understand this troubling result, we now
turn to a brief history of the Supreme Court’s approach to resolving
implication questions.
Over the past several decades, the federal judiciary, following the lead
of several key Supreme Court decisions, has become increasingly hesitant
to imply private rights of action from federal laws.71 During this time, the
once prevailing view that every legal wrong should be met with a remedy
lost ground in the courts and was replaced with strong deference indications
of congressional intent and purpose.72 Although the courts were implying
rights of action with less frequency, it was not until the seminal decision in
Cort v. Ash73 that federal courts were given an analytic framework for how
to decide implication questions.74 In Cort, the Supreme Court applied a
71. See id. at 865 (showing that a more "restrictive notion of when to imply private
causes of action" developed during the twentieth century in response to increases in federal
legislation).
72. See id. at 864–65 (pointing to the fact that the courts shifted away from the early
view that they should imply a remedy for all statutory wrongs where they were not expressly
granted in favor of the view that congressional intent should control the question of whether
a remedy should be provided); see also Donald H. Zeigler, Rights, Rights of Action, and
Remedies: An Integrated Approach, 76 WASH. L. REV 67, 68–69 (2001) (describing the role
of the Supreme Court in spurring the shift from the traditional view that courts should imply
remedies for wrongs where legislatures had failed to do so); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 374–75 (1982) (discussing the once common practice
of implying private rights of action, saying that "the judiciary normally recognized a remedy
for members of that class. Under this approach, federal courts . . . regarded the denial of a
remedy as the exception rather than the rule"). The Court, in Merrill Lynch, suggested that
this break from the remedial approach to implication questions was motivated in part by
increases in the volume and complexity of federal statutes. See id. at 377 ("The increased
complexity of federal legislation and the increased volume of federal litigation strongly
supported the desirability of a more careful scrutiny of legislative intent than Rigsby had
required.").
73. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 85 (1975) (declining to imply a private right of
action under a federal criminal statute making it a crime for corporations to make
contributions or expenditures in connection with Presidential elections). In Cort, a
stockholder in a Delaware corporation brought an action for damages against the corporation
for alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. § 610, which prohibits corporations from making
contributions or expenditures in connection with certain federal elections. Id. at 71–72. The
Court addressed the question of whether a private cause of action for damages should be
implied under § 610. Id. at 68. Announcing and applying a new four-part test to determine
whether a private right of action should be implied, the Court determined that it should not.
Id. at 78–85. The Court found that the implication of a private right of action was not
supported by the legislative history, would not further the main purpose of § 610, and would
intrude into an area of law traditionally left to the states. Id. at 69, 85.
74. See Stabile, supra note 69, at 867 (saying that Cort v. Ash "had a significant
impact on the implied cause of action doctrine" by introducing a "new method of analyzing
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comprehensive four factor test to be used when deciding whether to imply a
right of action from a federal statute.75 The Court stated:
In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute . . .
several factors are relevant. First, . . . does the statute create a federal
right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of
legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or
deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purpose of the
legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally,
is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law . . . so that it
would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal
76
law?

By focusing largely on statutory construction and purpose, this formulation
marks a stark departure from the earlier remedial analytic framework
towards a more focused inquiry into legislative intent.77
This shift towards a focus on legislative intent was solidified in 1979
when the Court announced that legislative intent was the "central inquiry"
in deciding whether to infer a private right of action from federal law.78
The Court distanced itself from the framework established in Cort v. Ash by
downplaying the importance of those factors that did not relate most
directly to congressional intent.79 Although some courts still "speak in
terms of a Cort analysis, the notion since 1979 has been that congressional
intent controls."80
Since congressional intent is the controlling consideration in whether
or not to infer a private right of action from a federal law, the question of
implication questions").
75. See Cort, 422 U.S. at 78 (explaining the decision of whether to imply a right of
action depends upon the plaintiff’s status as an intended beneficiary, legislative intent to
create a right of action, consistency with the legislative scheme, and consideration of
whether it is an area of law traditionally left to the states).
76. Id. (citations omitted).
77. See Stabile, supra note 69, at 867 (showing that the first two Cort factors focus
largely on legislative intent); see also Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575–
76 (1979) ("[T]he first three factors discussed in Cort . . . are ones traditionally relied upon
in determining legislative intent.").
78. See Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 575 ("The central inquiry remains whether Congress
intended to create, either expressly or by implication, a private cause of action."); see also
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 688 (1979) (saying that the Cort factors are to be
used as means of discovering legislative intent).
79. See Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 575 ("It is true that in Cort v. Ash, the Court set forth
four factors that it considered ‘relevant’ in determining whether a private remedy is implicit
in a statute not expressly providing one. But the Court did not decide that each of these
factors is entitled to equal weight.").
80. Stabile, supra note 69, at 870.

THE CHURCH AMENDMENT

731

how to interpret that intent is of vast importance. Determining legislative
intent from the bench can be an incredibly difficult task considering the
unavoidable ambiguities present in congressional statutes.81 Beyond the
text of the statute itself, the most logical starting place is the legislative
history; however, legislative history may itself produce equally
inconclusive results.82 The legislative history of the Church Amendment,
for instance, suggests that the Senators themselves were confused about the
possibility of a sanction for violations.83 They did not even mention private
enforcement.84 Acknowledging the commonality of such ambiguities, the
Supreme Court has alluded to the fact that legislative history is neither the
only nor last indicia of legislative intent.85
Although the Court has not clearly provided an analytic framework for
discovering legislative intent beyond the confines of text and legislative
history, a couple of approaches can, nonetheless, be distilled from Court
precedent.86 For instance, the Court has, in the past, taken notice of the
legislative and judicial context in which a law was enacted in order to infer
congressional intent to create or deny a right of action.87 This approach
considers Congress’s possible reliance on the formerly common judicial
81. See Brian G. Slocum, Overlooked Temporal Issues in Statutory Interpretation,
81 TEMPLE L. REV. 635, 639 (2008) ("The rules of interpretation are most important when
courts use them to resolve statutory ambiguities, and modern statutes are often unclear.
Congress inevitably leaves ambiguities in the statutes it enacts because it is unable and
frequently unwilling to legislate without ambiguities.").
82. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694 ("We must recognize, however, that the legislative
history of a statute that does not expressly create or deny a private remedy will typically be
equally silent or ambiguous on the question.").
83. See supra notes 47–51 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of
the Church Amendment and revealing the inconclusive nature of the Senate’s consideration
of penalties for statutory violations).
84. See 119 CONG. REC. 9598–9605 (Senate debates over the Church Amendment)
(making no mention of private enforcement).
85. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 694 (1979) ("‘[When] it is clear that
federal law has granted a class of persons certain rights, it is not necessary to show an
intention to create a private cause of action, although an explicit purpose to deny such cause
of action would be controlling.’" (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 82 (1975))); see also
Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18 (1979) ("This Court has held
that the failure of Congress expressly to consider a private remedy is not inevitably
inconsistent with an intent on its part to make such a remedy available.").
86. See Stabile, supra note 69, at 888–93, 899–901 (pointing to legislative and judicial
context, the possible necessity of implication, and consistency with Congress’s purpose as
indicia used by the Court at various times to determine legislative intent).
87. See id. at 888–90 (discussing the ramifications of the Court’s consideration of
context in deciphering legislative intent).
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practice of implying causes of action from statutes that do not expressly
provide them.88
The 1979 decision in Cannon v. University of Chicago89 provides a
useful example of how contextual considerations can help determine
legislative intent concerning the provision of private rights of action. In
Cannon, the Court devoted considerable attention to the fact that Congress
likely relied upon the then prevailing practice of the courts implying private
rights of action under similar statutes like Title VI.90 Noting the similarity
between the provisions of Title VI and Title IX,91 the Court said that
although Congress did not directly address the question of a private cause
of action, the fact that they considered the enforcement mechanisms of Title
VI raises a presumption that they expected Title IX to be treated similarly
by the courts.92 Although the Cannon Court did not ultimately rely upon
this analysis directly, citing ample additional evidence from the text and
legislative history from which to infer intent, its consideration of

88. See id. at 888 ("Context includes the then-prevailing understanding of substantive
law, as well as the then-prevailing view of courts as to when implication of a private cause
of action is appropriate and as to the role of the federal courts in the creation of federal
common law.").
89. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 717 (holding that a private cause of action is implied
under Title IX "despite the absence of any express authorization for it in the statute"). In
Cannon, petitioner brought a lawsuit under Title IX against the University of Chicago
alleging that the University failed to admit her to the medical school because she was a
woman. Id. at 680. The Court considered the question of whether Title IX, which did not
explicitly authorize a private right of action, provides for a private cause of action by
implication. Id. at 688. Upon consideration of legislative intent, the Court concluded that a
private cause of action was indeed implicitly created under Title IX. Id. at 717. In arriving
at this conclusion, the Court considered not only the text and legislative history of the statute
but also the larger context in which the law was passed. Id. at 696.
90. See id. at 697–98 ("[W]e are especially justified in presuming both that those
representatives were aware of the prior interpretation of Title VI and that that interpretation
reflects their intent with respect to Title IX.").
91. Compare Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006)
(providing generally that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color,
or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance"), with Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006)
(providing that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance").
92. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 696 (1979) (saying that Congress’s
consideration of Title VI’s enforcement mechanisms demonstrates their assumption "that it
would be interpreted and applied as Title VI had been during the preceding eight years").
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Congress’s likely reliance on judicial practices demonstrates the
applicability of contextual considerations in determining legislative intent.93
In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., v. Curran,94 the Court
expanded on the contextual approach to inferring intent by saying that the
starting point for deciding implication questions is an examination of the
legal context in which the law was adopted.95 In this case, the Court found
the prior implication of a remedy under the pre-amended version of the
Commodities Exchange Act to be strong evidence of congressional intent to
retain similar enforcement provisions in the amended version.96 Although
this case involved the amendment of a statute under which a private right of
action had previously been implied, the Court gives no indication that their
analysis of the legal context is limited to such cases. To the contrary, the
Court spoke of context as being the starting point for all implication
questions and said that evaluating Congress’s perception of the state of the
law is necessary whether they are "shaping or reshaping" legislation.97
Despite these prior recognitions that contextual considerations are
instrumental in the determination of congressional intent, the 2001 decision
in Alexander v. Sandoval98 casts some doubt on the continued viability of

93. See id. at 699 (stating that "[i]t is not . . . necessary to rely on these presumptions"
due to textual and historical evidence that Congress understood Title IX to create a private
cause of action).
94. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 388
(1982) (holding that a private right of action was intended and therefore available under the
1974 amendments to the Commodities Exchange Act [CEA]).
95. See id. at 378 ("In determining whether a private cause of action is implicit in a
federal statutory scheme . . . the initial focus must be on the state of the law at the time the
legislation was enacted.").
96. See id. at 381–82 ("[T]he fact that a comprehensive reexamination and significant
amendment of the CEA left intact the statutory provisions under which the federal courts had
implied a cause of action is itself evidence that Congress affirmatively intended to preserve
that remedy.").
97. Id. at 378.
98. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (holding that no private right
of action exists under § 602 of Title VI). In Sandoval, the Court considered whether a
private right of action was implied under § 602 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 279.
Rejecting the notion that this question had already been answered affirmatively in prior
Court decisions finding a right of action under § 601, Justice Scalia, speaking for the Court,
said that the "right must come, if at all, from the independent force of § 602." Id. at 286.
After echoing the well-established rule that congressional intent controls such
determinations, the Court found no such intent to create a private right of action under § 602.
Id. at 289. In so doing, the Court addressed the applicability of contextual considerations to
the question saying that "legal context matters only to the extent that it clarifies text." Id. at
288.
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contextual arguments in implication cases.99 Addressing the importance of
contextual considerations, the Court disagreed with the notion that "cases
interpreting statutes enacted prior to Cort v. Ash have given dispositive
weight to the expectations that the enacting Congress had formed in light of
the contemporary legal context."100 The Court then continued to downplay
the relevance of legal context in favor of an isolated analysis of the text and
structure.101 Finding no textual or structural evidence of congressional
intent to create a right of action, the Court held that a right of action would
not lie under § 602 of Title VI.102
While Sandoval does suggest that extra-textual considerations will be
accorded less consideration than a more liberal reading of past precedent
would permit, the Court does not completely rule out contextual
considerations where the text of the statute leaves open the possibility of a
private remedy.103 The Court makes much of the fact that the text under
consideration in Sandoval had a regulatory, rather than a rights-creating,
focus.104 Therefore, the Court’s hesitancy to consider the contemporary
legal context in Sandoval is supported by the fact that the text itself
suggests a private remedy was not intended.105 Where a statute contains
rights-creating language found in other statutes where private remedies
99. See id. ("In determining whether statutes create private rights of action, as in
interpreting statutes generally, legal context matters only to the extent it clarifies text."
(citations omitted)).
100. Id. at 287–88 (internal quotation marks omitted).
101. See id. (reading past decisions that incorporated contextual analysis narrowly by
saying that two such cases involved the use of "verbatim statutory text that courts had
previously interpreted to create a private right of action" while a third pertained to a statutory
text that "independently supported" a private right of action).
102. See id. at 289, 293 (finding no evidence of congressional intent to create a private
right of action and holding, therefore, that no such right exists).
103. See id. at 288 ("We have never accorded dispositive weight to context shorn of
text."). Compare id. (saying that contextual considerations attain relevance only where they
buttress or clarify the text), with Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., v. Curran, 456
U.S. 353, 378 (1982) ("In determining whether a private cause of action is implicit in a
federal statutory scheme . . . the initial focus must be on the state of the law at the time the
legislation was enacted.").
104. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288–89 (2001) ("It is immediately clear
that the ‘rights-creating’ language so critical to the Court’s analysis in Cannon of § 601 is
completely absent from § 602 . . . . Far from displaying congressional intent to create new
rights, § 602 limits agencies to ‘effectuating’ rights already created by § 601." (citations
omitted)).
105. See id. at 289 ("Statutes that focus on the person regulated rather than the
individuals protected create ‘no implication of an intent to confer private rights on a
particular class of persons.’" (quoting California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 294 (1981)));
id. at 288 (saying that "legal context matters only to the extent it clarifies text").
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have been implied, a different result with respect to consideration of legal
context could, and arguably should, be reached.106
The language of the Church Amendment fits somewhere between the
pure rights-creating language of provisions such as § 601 of Title VI and
the clearly regulatory language of § 602 of Title VI.107 Although the
Church Amendment is aimed at the entities receiving appropriations under
the Act rather than the persons protected, it does recognize individual,
protected interests previously unknown to the law.108 The Church
Amendment must, therefore, be distinguished from § 602 of Title VI under
which the Court found no textual evidence of Congressional intent to create
a right of action.109 Statutory language of this sort, arguably creating new
rights by language somewhat dissimilar from other provisions found to
create private rights of action, seems to justify the kind of clarifying
exploration into contemporary legal context suggested by the Court in
Sandoval.110 Therefore, Sandoval should not prevent litigants who make
well-crafted arguments which emphasize the Church Amendment’s focus

106. See id. at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority reached the wrong
conclusion concerning whether § 602 should be read independently from Title VI as a
whole, which has been held to "benefit a particular class of individuals," and that the
majority, therefore, improperly refused to consider contextual evidence).
107. Compare Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006)
("No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." (emphasis added)),
and id. § 602, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 ("Each Federal department and agency which is
empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to any program or activity . . . is
authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of Section 2000d . . . by issuing rules,
regulations, or orders of general applicability . . . ." (emphasis added)), with Church
Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c) ("No entity which receives [appropriations under this
act] . . . may discriminate in the employment, promotion, or termination of employment of
any physician or other health care personnel . . . ." (emphasis added)).
108. But see Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., No. 09 CV 3120(RJD), 2010 WL
169485, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010), aff’d, 626 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2010) (concluding that
the absence of "classic individual rights creating language of Title VI and Title IX" suggests
that the Church Amendment did not create individual rights that could be enforced in court).
109. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c) (creating new individual protections not present
elsewhere in the statute or code), with Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 289 ("Far from displaying
congressional intent to create new rights, § 602 limits agencies to ‘effectuating’ rights
already created by § 601." (citing Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act § 602, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d-1)).
110. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288 (2001) ("In determining whether
statutes create private rights of action, as in interpreting statutes generally, legal context
matters only to the extent it clarifies text.").
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on the individuals protected from offering contextual evidence to
demonstrate congressional intent to create a private remedy.111
Sandoval does, however, place another obstacle before litigants
bringing suit under the Church Amendment because it represents a
significant step in the Court’s gradual departure from the pre-Cort remedial
Considering the respondent’s
approach to implication questions.112
arguments to be a request to consider Title VI under that remedial
framework, which was prevalent at the time of Title VI’s adoption, the
Court said, "[h]aving sworn off the habit of venturing beyond Congress’s
intent, we will not accept respondents’ invitation to have one last drink."113
Instead, the Court emphasized that its own role was merely to determine
whether Congress intended to create a private remedy to seek redress for
violations of the private right recognized in the statute.114 Although this
language does not, on its own, dictate the conclusion that Sandoval
represents a heightened standard for proving the existence of private rights
of action, the strength of the language does suggest, as noted by the dissent,
certain distaste for implied rights of action by the majority.115
This distaste for implied rights of action was demonstrated once again
in the 2008 decision in Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. ScientificAtlanta116 in which the Court refused to expand the scope of the existing
111. See id. (explaining that "rights-creating" language is "critical" to a successful
showing of congressional intent to create a right of action). But see id. at 289 ("Statutes that
focus on the person regulated rather than the individuals protected create ‘no implication of
an intent to confer rights on a particular class of persons.’" (quoting California v. Sierra
Club, 451 U.S. 287, 294 (1981))).
112. See id. at 287 (saying that the Court had abandoned the pre-Cort remedial
approach which had emphasized the courts’ duty to "be alert to provide such remedies as are
necessary to make effective" Congress’s purposes in enacting a statute (quoting J.I. Case Co.
v. Bork, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964))).
113. Id.
114. See id. at 286–87 ("The judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress has passed
to determine whether it displays an intent to create not just a private right but also a private
remedy . . . . Without [statutory intent], a cause of action does not exist and courts may not
create one . . . ." (citations omitted)).
115. See id. at 315 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (saying that the majority’s rejection of a
private right of action under § 602 demonstrates an "evident antipathy toward implied rights
of action").
116. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 165
(2008) (holding that the § 10b private right of action should not be extended because it was
determined to be contrary to congressional intent). In Stoneridge, the petitioner filed suit
under § 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 alleging fraudulent behavior on behalf
of customers and suppliers of Charter Communications, in which they held stock. Id. at
152–53. The Court considered whether the implied right of action previously recognized by
the Court under § 10b should be extended to cover aiders and abettors. Id. at 157–58. The
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right of action under § 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.117
Although Stoneridge was a case in which strong evidence of congressional
intent to deny the extension of the right of action was present, it nonetheless
indicates a strengthening of the Court’s presumption against implied rights
of action.118
VI. Past Judicial Treatment of an Implied Right of Action Under the
Church Amendment
The federal courts have had relatively few occasions to address the
question of the existence of a right of action under the Church Amendment.
In the time between its enactment and the Cenzon-DeCarlo case, the courts
have only addressed the question, either directly or indirectly, on four
separate occasions.119 The question first came up, albeit tangentially, in the
1973 case Watkins v. Mercy Medical Center.120 There, the plaintiff filed a
Court found that Congress had made an affirmative choice not to extend the scope of Section
10b to such actors. Id. at 158. Therefore, the Court reasoned, to expand the scope of the
right of action would "undermine Congress’ determination that this class of defendants
should be pursued by the SEC . . . ." Id. at 163. In so ruling, the Court reemphasized the
oft-stated proposition that a private right of action would not be found where congressional
intent to do so is found lacking. Id. at 164.
117. See id. at 165 ("Though it remains the law, the § 10b private right should not be
extended beyond its present boundaries.").
118. See id. at 158, 166 (finding evidence that Congress had affirmatively rejected an
extension of the right of action under Section 10b); id. at 179–80 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority’s conclusion that "Congress did not impliedly authorize [the] private
cause of action" and arguing that the decision "cuts back further on Congress’ intended
remedy"); id. at 175–76 ("The Court’s current view of implied causes of action is that they
are merely a ‘relic’ of our prior ‘heady days.’" (quoting Corr. Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534
U.S. 61, 75 (2001))).
119. See Carey v. Maricopa County, 602 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1144 (D. Ariz. Mar. 12,
2009) (ruling that the plaintiff had the right to bring a claim for damages against Maricopa
County defendants under 28 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c)); Nead v. Bd. of Trs. of E. Ill. Univ., No.
05-2137, 2006 WL 1582454, at *5 (C.D. Ill. June 6, 2006) (holding that the Church
Amendment does not contain an implied private right of action); Moncivaiz v. Dekalb
County, No. 03 C 50226, 2004 WL 539994, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2004) (holding that no
private right of action exists under the Church Amendment); Watkins v. Mercy Med. Ctr.,
364 F. Supp. 799, 803 (D. Idaho 1973) (holding that the Church Amendment required the
reinstatement of a doctor who had been released because of his failure to endorse the
hospital’s ethical and religious directives).
120. See Watkins, 364 F. Supp. at 803 (holding that the Church Amendment required
the reinstatement of a doctor who had been released because of his failure to endorse the
hospital’s ethical and religious directives). In Watkins, the plaintiff filed a § 1983 suit
against his employer hospital which had refused to extend staff privileges to him because of
his failure to abide by the hospital’s ethical guidelines concerning abortion and sterilization.
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§ 1983121 action against his employer hospital for its alleged failure to
extend his staff privileges because of his refusal to abide by the hospital’s
ethical guidelines concerning abortion and sterilization.122 The court
addressed the question of whether the receipt of Hill-Burton Act funds
sufficiently colored the hospital with state action so as to give rise to a
§ 1983 claim.123 The court concluded the receipt of federal funding did not
give rise to a finding that the hospital’s hiring decisions were colored with
state action.124 However, the court did find that the Church Amendment
prevented the hospital from requiring "its staff to adhere to the religious or
moral beliefs which support the hospital’s policy as a condition of
employment or extension of privileges."125
Although the question was not directly before the court, the fact that
the court recognized the enforceability of the Church Amendment’s
protections certainly supports the argument for implying a cause of
action.126 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed and made specific
reference to the trial court’s order of reinstatement as being a part of the
judgment rather than mere dicta.127 Watkins was denied damages for his
Id. at 800. The court’s narrow inquiry was whether the receipt of Hill-Burton funding made
the hospital a state actor for the purposes of evaluating § 1983 liability. Id. at 801. The
court concluded that it did not. Id. at 802. The court did state, however, that the Church
Amendment prevented the hospital from requiring "its staff to adhere to the religious or
moral beliefs" underpinning the hospital’s policies as a condition of employment. Id. at 803.
121. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (providing a private right of action for individuals
against state actors or individuals and entities acting under color of state law for redress of
violations of federal constitutional or statutory protections).
122. See Watkins, 364 F. Supp. at 800 ("The plaintiff brought this action . . . contending
that he had been denied medical staff privileges for failure to agree to, or abide by, the
ethical or religious directives under the Code of Ethics for Catholic Hospitals . . . .").
123. See id. at 801 ("In order to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it must
be shown that Mercy Medical Center and its Board of Directors were acting under color of
State law when they denied Dr. Watkins staff privileges.").
124. See id. at 802 ("Since hospital policy is not and has not been affected by the
benefits bestowed upon it by the state, defendants were not acting under color of state
law . . . .").
125. Id. at 803; see also Watkins v. Mercy Med. Ctr., 520 F.2d 894, 895–96 (9th Cir.
1975) ("[T]he court found that appellee had violated 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 . . . . The judgment
provided for the restoration of Dr. Watkins to staff privileges on condition that he not
perform abortions or sterilizations contrary to the hospital’s rules.").
126. See Eisendstadt, supra note 51, at 154 (suggesting that the court’s treatment of the
Church Amendment was largely dicta).
127. See Watkins, 520 F.2d at 896 (saying that "[t]he judgment provided for the
restoration of Dr. Watkins to staff privileges"). But see Eisendstadt, supra note 51, at 154
(suggesting that the district court’s language regarding the reinstatement of Dr. Watkins was
"in dicta").
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§ 1983 claim because the hospital’s receipt of federal funding was
deemed to be insufficient to color their employment and ethical policies
with state action.128 It is not clear how the courts might have responded
had Watkins sought damages directly under the Church Amendment.129
However, the fact that the Ninth Circuit took no issue with the District
Court’s order of reinstatement, a private remedy, suggests that they might
have responded favorably had the plaintiff effectively made out a case for
damages.
After Watkins, many years passed before the courts had occasion to
address the existence of a private remedy under the Church Amendment.
During this roughly thirty-year gap, the judiciary’s approach to
implication questions underwent significant change.130 The existence of
this gap between cases addressing the existence of a right of action under
the Church Amendment thus poses a great difficulty as courts must now
choose how to properly apply newly created interpretive rules to outdated
legislation.131 An inflexible application of current implication doctrine in
cases involving dated statutes such as the Church Amendment might
thwart, rather than preserve, congressional intent.132 However, stepping
back in time by attempting to understand congressional intent through the
lens of context is a difficult and time-consuming task that must be far less
appealing than more readily accessible indicators of intent such as
legislative history. The following cases suggest that Church Amendment
plaintiffs will face the difficult task of convincing the courts to move

128. See Watkins, 520 F.2d at 896 ("‘The mere receipt of Hill-Burton funds . . . is not
sufficient connection between the state and the private activity of which appellant complains
to make out state action . . . .’" (quoting Ascherman v. Presbyterian Hosp. of Pac. Med. Ctr.,
507 F.2d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 1974))).
129. See Eisendstadt, supra note 51, at 154 (explaining that the Ninth Circuit applied
the Church Amendment without providing any discussion of its "constitutionality or the
appropriate means of reliance on it").
130. See supra notes 71–118 and accompanying text (describing the development of the
Supreme Court’s approach to implication questions throughout the twentieth century with a
particular emphasis on the years since 1975).
131. See Stabile, supra note 69, at 889–90 (arguing that modern courts, deciding
whether to imply a right of action under an older statute, must take into account how the then
existing courts dealt with implication questions and how Congress understood implication at
that time).
132. Cf. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 698–99 (1979) (saying that even where
the Court has adopted a more stringent interpretive approach for implication questions, it
must still evaluate congressional action in light of "its contemporary legal context").
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beyond an isolated analysis of legislative history in their search for
congressional intent.133
In 2004, the Northern District of Illinois heard the case of Moncivaiz v.
Dekalb County134 and denied private relief under the Church
Amendment.135 In Moncivaiz, the plaintiff, a part-time secretary, alleged
that she had been denied employment as a full-time secretary with Dekalb
County’s Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) program because of her
expressed opposition to abortion.136 The plaintiff was further told that as an
employee of the Health Department, she would be expected to "uphold the
views of the department even outside of the facility."137 Upon receiving
this information, the plaintiff resigned her part-time position and filed suit
citing numerous violations of federal statutory and constitutional law.138
In granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss the Church Amendment
claim, the court relied upon Seventh Circuit precedent and the oft-quoted
maxim that a strong presumption exists against the implication of private
rights of action.139 In the court’s view, this presumption could not be
overcome in the absence of proof from the legislative history that Congress
intended to grant a private remedy.140 Due to the court’s brief treatment of
the Church Amendment claim, it is difficult to determine exactly why it
was denied. From the language used it seems that the lack of evidence
from the legislative history was the decisive point.141 The Northern District
133. See Moncivaiz v. Dekalb Cnty., No. 03 C 50226, 2004 WL 539994, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 12, 2004) (determining congressional intent with regards to a private right of action
under the Church Amendment by means of analyzing only the legislative history); Nead v.
Bd. of Trs. of E. Ill. Univ., No. 05-2137, 2006 WL 1582454, at *5 (C.D. Ill. June 6, 2006)
(same).
134. See Moncivaiz, 2004 WL 539994, at *3 (holding that the Church Amendment does
not support the implication of a private right of action).
135. See id. (dismissing the plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7).
136. See id. at *1 (describing how the plaintiff was told she was not hired for the
position because of her views concerning abortion in spite of her qualifications for the job).
137. Id.
138. See id. (listing the plaintiff’s many claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title
VII, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7, and the Illinois Health Care Right of Conscience Act).
139. See id. at *3 ("The statute does not create an express private right of action and a
strong presumption exists against creation of an implied right of action." (citing Endsley v.
City of Chi., 230 F.3d 276, 281 (7th Cir. 2000))).
140. See id. ("Plaintiff does not cite any legislative history to suggest a private right of
action was intended. Absent such a suggestion, the court ‘will not imply a private right of
action where none appears in the statute.’" (quoting Endsley, 230 F.3d at 281)).
141. See id. (suggesting that legislative history is the only acceptable source of proof
that an implied private right of action should be found).
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of Illinois did not make reference to any other indicia of legislative
intent.142 As was the case here in Moncivaiz, an exclusive focus on
legislative history to determine whether a private right of action was
intended under the Church Amendment will result in the quick resolution of
motions to dismiss in favor of defendants.
The question of whether a private right of action exists under the
Church Amendment was next raised two years later in the neighboring
Central District of Illinois.143 As with Moncivaiz, the plaintiff in Nead v.
Board of Trustees of Eastern Illinois University144 similarly claimed that
she was passed over for a promotion due to her expression of opposition to
abortion and the use of emergency contraception during an interview.145
The plaintiff’s Church Amendment claim, based on 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b)–
(d), consisted primarily of the argument that the hospital had discriminated
against her in their promotion decisions because she had refused to
participate in the dispensing of Emergency Contraception (EC) on the basis
of her religious and moral beliefs.146 However, as in Moncivaiz, the court
did not reach the merits of the plaintiff’s claim but rather granted the
defendants’ motion to dismiss upon finding that the Church Amendment
did not grant a private right of action.147
The court in Nead relied heavily on the precedent set by the Northern
District of Illinois in Moncivaiz.148 The court echoed the same language
used by the Moncivaiz Court saying again that "a strong presumption exists

142. See id. (mentioning only legislative history as a possible indicator of legislative
intent to provide a private right of action).
143. See Nead v. Bd. of Trs. of E. Ill. Univ., No. 05-2137, 2006 WL 1582454, at *5
(C.D. Ill. June 6, 2006) (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim brought
under the Church Amendment).
144. See id. (holding that the Church Amendment did not support the finding of an
implied right of action).
145. See id. at *1 (outlining the details of the plaintiff’s interview including her
response to the question of whether she would be willing to dispense emergency
contraception).
146. See id. at *5 (describing the formulation of the plaintiff’s claim under the Church
Amendment); see also 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b)–(d) (2006) ("No entity [receiving certain
federal funding] may discriminate [against] health care personnel . . . because he refused
to . . . assist in the performance of [abortion] . . . because of his religious beliefs or moral
convictions . . . .").
147. See id. ("The plaintiff makes an ardent but unavailing argument for reading a
private right of action into the statute . . . . The motion to dismiss Count V is granted.").
148. See id. (saying that the existence of an implied right of action under the Church
Amendment had already been answered in the negative by the Moncivaiz court).

742

68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 717 (2011)

against the creation of an implied right of action."149 The court also
incorporated, by quotation, the suggestion from Moncivaiz that evidence
from the legislative history is necessary to establish a suggestion that
Congress intended to provide a private right of action.150 The final
disposition of the claim reinforces this position since it was dismissed for
lack of evidence from the legislative history to support the implication of a
right of action.151 The Nead case solidifies the implication raised by
Moncivaiz that exclusive reliance on legislative history as the indicator of
congressional intent will result in the dismissal of claims brought under the
Church Amendment.152
Moncivaiz and Nead both relied on the Seventh Circuit case Endsley v.
City of Chicago153 in their determination that a private right of action was
not implicit in the Church Amendment.154 The Moncivaiz decision suggests
that the court was relying on Endsley for the proposition that evidence from
the legislative history is necessary to demonstrate congressional intent to
create a right of action. While Endsley’s "strong presumption" language
certainly suggests that implication questions will more often than not be
answered in the negative, it does not, however, seem to demand narrowing
the inquiry to the legislative history alone.155 In Endsley, the Seventh
149. Id. (quoting Moncivaiz v. Dekalb Cnty., No. 03 C 50226, 2004 WL 539994, at *3
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2004)).
150. See id. ("‘Plaintiff does not cite any legislative history to suggest a private right of
action was intended. Absent such a suggestion, the court, will not imply a private right of
action where none appears in the statute.’" (quoting Moncivaiz, 2004 WL 539994, at *3)).
151. See id. ("[C]ounsel provides no legislative history to support Nead’s claim. In
fact, a cursory review of the legislation as a whole suggests the main purpose was to
appropriate funds for health care services. The motion to dismiss . . . is granted.").
152. See id. (dismissing the plaintiff’s Church Amendment claim due to lack of
evidence from legislative history); see also Moncivaiz, 2004 WL 539994, at *3 (same).
153. Endsley v. City of Chi., 230 F.3d 276, 280 (7th Cir. 2000) (upholding the district
court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims against the City of Chicago which alleged
violations of the Commerce Clause, the Sherman Act, and a federal transportation statute
limiting the taking of tolls on federally funded roadways). In Endsley, the plaintiff filed suit
challenging the city’s appropriation of tolls taken on the Chicago Skyway. Id. at 278. One
of the claims, which was based on a federal transportation statute, was dismissed by the
district court because it found no private right of action under the statute. Id. at 280. The
Seventh Circuit affirmed, saying that an implied right of action could not be found after a
consideration of the statute’s language, structure, legislative history, and intended
beneficiaries evidenced no congressional intent to create one. Id.
154. See Moncivaiz, 2004 WL 539994 at *3 (citing Endsley for the proposition that
there is a heavy presumption against implying a right of action in a federal statute); Nead v.
Bd. of Trs. of E. Ill. Univ., No. 05-2137, 2006 WL 1582454, at *5 (C.D. Ill. June 6, 2006)
(same).
155. See Endsley, 230 F.3d at 280 (looking to the express language of the statute in
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Circuit focused on more than just the presence of evidence in the legislative
history to make its determination that a private right of action should not be
implied under a certain federal transportation statute. Instead of focusing
solely on the legislative record, the Endsley Court evaluated the statute’s
text, language, overall structure, as well as its intended beneficiaries before
determining that a right of action should not be implied.156 Whereas the
federal transportation statute at issue in Endsley did not include the
plaintiffs as intended beneficiaries, the Church Amendment most certainly
includes individuals like the plaintiff in Moncivaiz as beneficiaries of its
protections.157 Neither Nead nor Moncivaiz suggest that considerations
such as this were weighed in conjunction with considerations of legislative
history.158 Had they been considered, it is possible, although still uncertain,
that a different conclusion might have been reached. Due to the silence of
the legislative history of the Church Amendment on the existence of a
private right of action, if plaintiffs seeking relief under this statute want to
survive a motion to dismiss they must persuade the courts to take a more
comprehensive look at factors indicative of legislative intent rather than
merely relying on legislative history.159
Prior to Cenzon-DeCarlo, the most recent opportunity for a federal
court to address the question of the existence of a private remedy under the
Church Amendment came in 2009 in Carey v. Maricopa County.160 In
Carey, the plaintiff brought a series of claims against Maricopa County
addition to its structure, legislative history, and intended beneficiaries).
156. See id. (evaluating statutory text, structure, legislative history, and the question of
whether the statute was written for a particular class of intended beneficiaries prior to
concluding that a right of action should not be implied).
157. Compare 23 U.S.C. § 129(a)(3) (2006) (generally setting forth the requirements
for public authorities wishing to operate toll roads including an agreement with the Secretary
of Transportation on a plan for properly allocating the toll proceed to the payment of debts
and maintenance of the road), with Church Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c) (2006)
(providing that no entity receiving specified federal funds may discriminate against
individuals because of their refusal to participate in abortion procedures due to religious or
moral convictions).
158. See Moncivaiz v. Dekalb Cnty., No. 03 C 50226, 2004 WL 539994, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 12, 2004) (mentioning only legislative history as an indicia of legislative intent to
create or deny a right of action); Nead, 2006 WL 1582454, at *5 (C.D. Ill. June 6, 2006)
(same).
159. See Eisendstadt, supra note 51, at 160 (saying that the legislative history of the
Church Amendment gives little indication concerning the existence of a private right of
action under the statute).
160. See Carey v. Maricopa Cnty., 602 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1144 (D. Ariz. Mar. 12, 2009)
(ruling that the plaintiff had the right to bring a claim for damages against Maricopa County
defendants under 28 U.S.C. § 300a-7).
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which he claimed attempted to remove him from leadership positions at
Maricopa County Medical Center because of his participation in and
position on abortions.161 Defendants’ motions for summary judgment on
each of the plaintiff’s federal law claims were denied.162 Surprisingly, the
court ruled that the plaintiff’s punitive damages claim under the Church
Amendment survived the summary judgment motion without providing
even a cursory discussion concerning the propriety of implying a right of
action under the statute.163 While this is certainly a recent example of a
private remedy being allowed under the Church Amendment, as CenzonDeCarlo’s counsel rightly pointed out, the fact that the implication of a
private remedy was not addressed by the court may make Carey somewhat
unpersuasive in cases where that issue is directly in dispute.164
Not surprisingly, the result in Cenzon-DeCarlo suggests that the
Eastern District of New York was not persuaded by the Carey decision.165
As with the only other cases that directly address the propriety of implying
a right of action under the Church Amendment, Nead and Moncivaiz, the
district court in Cenzon-DeCarlo found ample justification from
authoritative Supreme Court and Circuit Court precedent to quickly dispose
of the plaintiff’s claim.166 Although the Cenzon-DeCarlo court’s analysis
differed from the earlier Church Amendment decisions, the result reinforces
the reluctance of the modern courts to recognize implied remedies.167 The
161. See id. at 1135 (stating that the plaintiff’s unauthorized rotation with Planned
Parenthood was used by the County as a reason to remove him from leadership positions
amounting to, in the plaintiff’s view, "unlawful discrimination . . . on the basis of his
religious and moral views under state and federal law").
162. See id. at 1136 ("Each of Plaintiff’s federal claims against County Defendants will
survive summary judgment.").
163. See id. at 1144 ("Defendants do not dispute that there is no bar to his recovery of
punitive damages against the Kunaseks under § 1983 or Title VII, nor against all County
Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7. Thus, those claims will stand.").
164. See id. (suggesting that punitive damages were allowed under the Church
Amendment because of the defendant’s failure to make an assertion to the contrary); see also
Response to Letter Request for Pre-Motion Conference at 2, Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount
Sinai Hosp., No. 09 CV 3120(RJD), 2010 WL 169485 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010) ("[J]ust this
year the United States District Court in Arizona not only recognized an individual right, but
allowed the plaintiff . . . to seek punitive damages").
165. See Cenzon-DeCarlo, 2010 WL 169485, at *4 (dismissing the plaintiff’s claim
brought under the Church Amendment due to the finding that it does not imply a private
right of action and making no mention of the different result reached in Carey).
166. See id. at *3–4 (referencing a host of Supreme Court opinions holding that the
propriety of implying a right of action depends entirely on congressional intent and holding
that evidence of such intent is lacking in the Church Amendment).
167. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 315 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
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result in Cenzon-DeCarlo is made all the more damaging to plaintiffs
seeking to convince courts of the propriety of an implied right of action
under the Church Amendment because the dismissal of the claim on the
basis that the text itself definitively proves the absence of congressional
intent effectively precludes the introduction of extra-textual evidence of
congressional intent such as contemporary legal context.168
In disposing of Cenzon-DeCarlo’s claim, the Eastern District of New
York relied heavily on Gonzaga University v. Doe169 in effort to show that
the Church Amendment, far from showing congressional intent to create a
private remedy, fails to show congressional intent to create a private
right.170 In Gonzaga, the Supreme Court reasoned that the initial inquiry in
an implied right of action case is substantially the same as in cases brought
under § 1983.171 In both cases, the Court must first determine whether
Congress intended for the statute to create a federal right rather than mere
(saying that the Supreme Court’s rejection of a private remedy demonstrates an "evident
antipathy toward implied rights of action"). Compare supra notes 1–8 and accompanying
text (discussing the result reached by the Eastern District of New York in Cenzon-DeCarlo
which stemmed from the court’s determination that the Church Amendment did not contain
sufficiently strong rights-creating language to justify implication), with supra notes 134–59
and accompanying text (discussing the reliance of the Nead and Moncivaiz courts on the
absence of proof in the legislative history concerning congressional intent to create a private
remedy).
168. Cf. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288 ("In determining whether statutes create private
rights of action, as in interpreting statutes generally, legal context matters only to the extent
it clarifies text.").
169. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 290 (2002) (holding that the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act [FERPA] did not create a federal right enforceable
under § 1983). In Gonzaga, the plaintiff brought a § 1983 action against Gonzaga
University claiming unauthorized release of private information to an unauthorized person in
violation of FERPA. Id. at 277. The Supreme Court considered whether FERPA created a
federal right enforceable by private individuals bringing § 1983 actions. Id. at 276. The
Court held that FERPA did not confer enforceable rights. Id. at 290. In reaching this
conclusion, the Court found that FERPA lacked the classic rights-creating language showing
congressional intent to create a new right, had an aggregate rather than individual focus, and
contained an independent enforcement mechanism through the Department of Education.
Id. at 287–89.
170. See Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., No. 09 CV 3120(RJD), 2010 WL
169485, at 3–4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010) (dismissing the plaintiff’s argument that the Church
Amendment meaningfully differs from the statute at issue in Gonzaga and holding that the
Church Amendment similarly "lacks the classic individual rights-creating language . . .
under which implied rights of action have been found" (quoting Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 287)).
171. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284–85 ("But the initial inquiry—determining whether a
statute confers any right at all—is no different from the initial inquiry in an implied right of
action case . . . which is to determine whether or not a statute ‘confers rights on a particular
class of persons.’" (quoting California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 294 (1981))).
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"benefits or interests."172 The Court contrasted the provisions of the statute
at issue in Gonzaga which says "No funds shall be made available" with the
classic rights-creating language of Title VI, which is phrased in terms of the
individual protected, providing that "No person . . . shall . . . be subjected to
discrimination."173 The Court concluded that the "[n]o funds" language is
too far removed from the individuals protected to give rise to a claim under
§ 1983.174 The Eastern District of New York incorporated this line of
analysis in Cenzon-DeCarlo concluding that the lack of the classic "[n]o
person shall" language present in Title VI and Title IX meant that the
Church Amendment did not create private rights.175 Because there cannot
logically be a right of action to enforce a nonexistent right, CenzonDeCarlo’s arguments were rejected and the case dismissed.176
The Eastern District’s reliance on Gonzaga in dismissing CenzonDeCarlo’s claim is dissatisfying for two different reasons. First, Gonzaga
dealt with a claim brought under § 1983.177 Cenzon-DeCarlo, on the other
hand, concerns implication, a related but different question.178 Although
the language of the Gonzaga opinion downplays this dividing line for the
purpose of importing some standards from implication cases into the § 1983
case before the Court, it does not necessarily follow that language
incidental to the Court’s application of those standards to a § 1983 case
should be imported back into an implication decision.179 Second, the
172. See id. at 285 ("Both inquiries simply require a determination as to whether or not
Congress intended to confer individual rights upon a class of beneficiaries.").
173. Id. at 287.
174. See id. ("This focus is two steps removed from the interests of individual students
and parents and clearly does not confer the sort of ‘individual entitlement’ that is enforceable
under § 1983." (quoting Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 343 (1997))).
175. See Cenzon-DeCarlo, 2010 WL 169485, at *4 ("Like FERPA, the Church
Amendment lacks the classic individual rights-creating language of Title VI and Title IX
(‘No person . . . shall . . . be subjected to discrimination . . . .’) under which implied private
rights of action have been found." (citing Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 287 (2002))).
176. See id. (dismissing Cenzon-DeCarlo’s complaint on the grounds that no private
right was granted and therefore no private right of action was intended).
177. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 276 (2002) ("The question presented is
whether a student may sue a private university for damages under . . . 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . .
to enforce provisions of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 . . . .").
178. See Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., No. 09 CV 3120(RJD), 2010 WL
169485, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010) (answering in the negative the question of whether
the Church Amendment confers a private right of action); Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283
(discussing the similarities and differences between § 1983 and implied right of action
cases).
179. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283 ("[W]e further reject the notion that our implied
right of action cases are separate and distinct from our § 1983 cases. To the contrary, our
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Eastern District of New York’s treatment of Gonzaga takes the "rightscreating" analysis a step further than the Supreme Court did. The Supreme
Court indicated that the language of FERPA was too far removed from the
private interests at stake to support finding a private right.180 In so doing, it
compared FERPA’s language to the classic rights-creating provisions of
Title VI and Title IX; however, it did not treat the absence of Title IX’s "no
person" language as dispositive.181 Rather, the Court also considered
whether the statute concerned itself with aggregate or individual needs as
well as the method of enforcement provided by Congress in the statute.182
Alternatively, the Eastern District of New York effectively gives dispositive
weight to the absence of the "no person" language in the Church
Amendment.183
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district
court, albeit under a slightly different mode of analysis.184 Rather than
holding that the Church Amendment did not confer individual rights in the
first place, the Second Circuit focused on the absence of proof that
Congress intended to confer a private right of action.185 By focusing on
proof of congressional intent to confer a private mode of enforcement, the
Second Circuit produced a somewhat more palatable opinion than the
district court which ruled that Congress did not confer individual rights in
the first place. Although the Second Circuit stopped short of analyzing
congressional intent in light of the contemporary legal context, it did at
implied right of action cases should guide the determination of whether a statute confers
rights enforceable under § 1983."); see also id. ("We have recognized that whether a
statutory violation may be enforced through § 1983 ‘is a different inquiry than that involved
in determining whether a private right of action can be implied from a particular statute.’"
(quoting Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 n.9 (1990))).
180. See id. at 287 ("This focus is two steps removed from the interests of individual
students and parents and clearly does not confer the sort of individual entitlement that is
enforceable under § 1983." (citations omitted)).
181. See id. at 287–89 (considering, in addition to the difference between FERPA and
Titles VI and IX, the aggregate focus, the loose substantial compliance requirement, and the
agency policy focus of the statute to conclude that no private rights were conferred).
182. Id. at 288–89.
183. See Cenzon-DeCarlo, 2010 WL 169485, at *4 ("[I]t speaks to the funded entity
rather than to any benefitted class and, therefore, lacks the focus on individuals that would
indicate the necessary congressional intent that a private right of action be implied.").
184. See Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 626 F.3d 695, 699 (2d Cir. 2010)
("Section 300 does not confer upon Cenzon-DeCarlo a private right of action to enforce its
terms.").
185. See id. at 697–99 (acknowledging evidence that Congress intended to confer
individual rights but concluding that the Church Amendment "may be a statute in which
Congress conferred an individual right without an accompanying right of action").
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least examine congressional intent in light of the text, structure, and
legislative history of the statute.186 Ultimately, the court concluded that the
Church Amendment is nothing more than a ban on discriminatory
conduct.187 Relying on dicta from Cannon, the Second Circuit concluded
that a private right of action should not be implied under the Church
Amendment.188 In so finding, the court noted its willingness to accept the
reality that Congress may have created an individual right without an
accompanying remedy.189
Although it is certainly possible, as the Second Circuit suggests, that
Congress could create a private right without an accompanying right of
action, it seems reasonable, in the face of that troubling irony, to ask
whether that is the result Congress actually intended. This additional
inquiry might well lead the courts to acknowledge other indicators of
congressional intent such as the contemporary legal context in which the
statute was passed. In the case of the Church Amendment, this deeper
examination into legislative intent might well lead the courts to conclude
that Congress did intend for the statute to be privately enforced.190 In spite
of this small glimmer of hope for plaintiffs like Cenzon-DeCarlo, it is
necessary to acknowledge the clear impact of the Second Circuit’s decision
in Cenzon-DeCarlo—the federal courts are unlikely to recognize privately
enforceable rights under the Church Amendment. 191 The clear trend since
the mid-twentieth century has been away from implied rights of action and
towards a strict requirement of explicit congressional authorization for
private suits.192

186. Id.
187. See id. at 698–99 (concluding that the language of the Church Amendment
operates merely as a ban on discriminatory conduct (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441
U.S. 677, 690–93 (1979))).
188. See id. at 698 ("Cannon explicitly warns that language like that of Section 300
does not signal Congressional intent to create a private remedy.").
189. See id. at 698–99 ("Section 300 may be a statute in which Congress conferred an
individual right without an accompanying right of action.").
190. See infra Part VII (advancing an argument for finding an implied right of action
under the Church Amendment).
191. See supra notes 119–89 and accompanying text (examining the previous instances
of judicial rejection of an implied private right of action under the Church Amendment).
192. See supra notes 71–118 and accompanying text (demonstrating the departure of
the Supreme Court from the early remedial approach to deciding implication questions and
the Court’s adoption of a more restrictive approach to finding rights of action).
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VII. An Argument for an Implied Right of Action Under the Church
Amendment
Notwithstanding the trend away from finding implied rights of action,
Supreme Court precedent does not completely foreclose the possibility of
an implied remedy under the Church Amendment. There are valid
arguments to be made that should lead the courts to conduct a more
searching examination concerning the possibility of an implied remedy
under the Church Amendment. To begin with, plaintiffs under the Church
Amendment should carefully distinguish that statute from the one at issue
in Gonzaga to show that an individual right was created and intended by
Congress.193 Unlike FERPA, at issue in Gonzaga, the Church Amendment
is not clearly meant to condition the receipt of federal funds on compliance
with the statute.194 Certainly the language of the Church Amendment
differs from the language of Titles VI and IX which has been enshrined as
the "classic rights-creating language," yet the Church Amendment also
lacks the clear funds-conditioning language of FERPA.195 The language of
the Church Amendment lies somewhere in between these two extremes and
accordingly deserves a more searching inquiry to determine whether
Congress intended to create an individual right. Indeed, Senator Javits, who
sponsored the anti-discrimination portion of the Church Amendment, made
clear that it was crafted to protect the right of the individual to be free from
discrimination because of his or her position on abortion.196
If the purpose of the Church Amendment was merely to condition the
receipt of federal funds on compliance, one might wonder why Congress
193. See Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., No. 09 CV 3120(RJD), 2010 WL
169485, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010) (showing that the application of the Court’s
reasoning in Gonzaga to the Church Amendment effectively forecloses all other arguments
in favor of implying a right of action).
194. Compare Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 278–79 (2002) (showing that
FERPA was enacted to condition the receipt of federal funding on compliance with its
requirements as evidenced by its language that begins "No funds shall be made available" to
noncompliant programs (citations omitted)), with Church Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 300a7(c) (2006) (lacking funds-conditioning language like that in FERPA and proscribing certain
discriminatory actions by entities against individuals).
195. Compare FERPA, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g)(a) (2006) (beginning "[n]o funds shall be
made available under any applicable program" which fails to conform to the statute’s
privacy requirements), with Church Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c) (beginning "[n]o
entity . . . may discriminate in . . . employment . . . or extension of staff or other privileges"
on the basis of an individual’s willingness to participate in abortions or sterilizations).
196. See 119 CONG. REC. 9603 (1973) (statement of Senator Javits) ("I wish to make it
clear that that particular amendment simply will protect anybody who works for that hospital
against being fired or losing his hospital privileges . . . .").
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would fail to make that purpose explicit as it has done in other statutes such
as FERPA. Even if the Court’s analysis in Gonzaga is found to be
authoritative in the implication context, the courts should recognize that the
Church Amendment presents a different and more difficult case than the
FERPA provisions with which that case is concerned.197 The requirement,
as applied by the court in Cenzon-DeCarlo, that legislators from nearly
forty years ago adhere with strict precision to a wording that would only
later be dubbed as the "classic rights-creating language" seems to be a
strangely imprecise means of determining "whether or not Congress
intended to confer individual rights upon a class of beneficiaries."198
The anti-discrimination provision of the Church Amendment is
undeniably crafted to protect individuals from discriminatory behavior by
healthcare entities receiving federal funding because of their religious
beliefs or moral convictions concerning abortion or sterilization.199
Although worded differently, it is analogous to the protections of Title VI
which protects individuals from discrimination on the basis of race, color,
or national origin by entities receiving federal funding.200 Though aimed at
different forms of discrimination, both statutes share the same essential
elements. Both statutes affirm the right of individuals to be free from
certain forms of discrimination by entities that have been empowered by

197. See supra notes 194–95 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the Church
Amendment does not fit cleanly within either the classic rights-creating or the fundsconditioning framework).
198. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 285; see also Cenzon-DeCarlo, 2010 WL 169485, at *4
(suggesting that the failure to conform to the structure of Titles VI and IX demonstrates
Congress’s lack of intention to create a private right for individuals in the healthcare
industry).
199. See Church Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c) (prohibiting discrimination against
healthcare workers by entities receiving federal funds on the basis of the individual’s
religious beliefs or moral convictions); 119 CONG. REC. 9603 (comments by Senator Javits)
("I wish to make it clear that [the anti-discrimination provision] simply will protect anybody
who works for that hospital against being fired or losing his hospital privileges . . . ."); id.
(statement of Sen. Church) ("[I]f a physician who was part of a staff of a Catholic
hospital . . . were to perform [sterilizations or abortions] . . . then he would not be
discriminated against by the Catholic hospital for having performed those operations . . . .").
200. Compare Title VI § 602, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d ("No person in the United States shall,
on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance."), with Church Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c) (prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of religious beliefs or moral convictions regarding abortion or
sterilization against "any physician or other healthcare personnel" by any entity receiving
federal funding).
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federal funding.201 To conclude otherwise would be to blindly elevate form
over substance.
Adding force to the argument that Congress intended to create
individual rights by passing the Church Amendment is the fact that
§ 214(A) of the National Research Service Award Act of 1974, which
amended the original language of the Church Amendment, bears the
heading "Individual Rights."202 Although the Second Circuit acknowledged
this evidence, it was ultimately dismissive, saying that "the title alone
cannot confer individual rights; the most it could do is provide evidence of
Congressional intent to confer them."203 The court properly noted that it is
the Statutes at Large that provide the "legal evidence of laws" unless
Congress has enacted a title of the United States Code itself as positive
law.204 However, rather than acknowledge that Congress intended to create
an individual right, the court focused on the lack of evidence that Congress
intended to create a right of action.205 This approach is overly dismissive of
the role that evidence of intent to create an individual right plays in the
implication question. Such evidence signals congressional intent to create a
right of action,206 and its presence justifies an investigation into the statute’s
contemporary legal context.
Convincing the courts that the statute creates individual rights is a
necessary but insufficient step in proving the propriety of a private right of
action. The Supreme Court has often noted that litigants must prove not
merely the existence of a private right but must further prove that a private

201. See supra note 200 and accompanying text (detailing the similarities between the
Church Amendment and Title VI).
202. National Research Service Award Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-348, § 214, 88 Stat.
342, 353 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300 (2006)).
203. Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 626 F.3d 695, 697 (2d Cir. 2010).
204. See U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 448
(1993) ("[I]t is the Statutes at Large that provides the ‘legal evidence of laws,’ and despite its
omission from the Code section 92 remains on the books if the Statutes at Large so
dictates.").
205. See Cenzon-DeCarlo, 626 F.3d at 697 ("While there may be some colorable
evidence of intent to confer or recognize an individual right, there is no evidence that
Congress intended to create a right of action.").
206. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288–89 (2001) (beginning the
Court’s search for evidence of congressional intent to create a private right of action by
considering whether there is evidence of congressional intent to create an individual right);
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 689 (1979) ("First, the threshold question under Cort
is whether the statute was enacted for the benefit of a special class of which the plaintiff is a
member.").
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remedy was intended by Congress.207 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court
has been somewhat inconsistent concerning what level and kind of proof is
required to make this showing.208 Most recently, the Court has shown great
reluctance to consider extra-textual evidence of congressional intent on this
point, choosing rather to determine whether the text and structure give rise
to the inference that a private right of action was intended.209 In Sandoval,
the Court rejected the notion that contextual evidence could attain relevance
independent from the text of the statute, saying that "legal context matters
only to the extent it clarifies text."210 So what is needed is not an argument
that circumvents the statutory text and structure in favor of purely
contextual or policy arguments, rather, what is needed is a textual and
structural demonstration of the need for a clarifying exploration into legal
context.
Contextual considerations are necessary in the case of the Church
Amendment because the statute is susceptible to multiple interpretations.211
The Church Amendment is unlike both Title VI and FERPA, the two
statutory schemes considered in Gonzaga, in that it lacks provisions that
specifically authorize the withholding of funds in the case of
noncompliance.212 Of the three Senators that spoke concerning the
possibility of withholding funds, two suggested that funds would not be
withheld and the third expressed doubt as to whether the statute would be

207. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286 ("The judicial task is to interpret the statute
Congress has passed to determine whether it displays an intent to create not just a private
right but also a private remedy." (emphasis added)).
208. Compare Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 82 (1975) ("[When] it is clear that federal law
has granted a class of persons certain rights, it is not necessary to show an intention to create
a private cause of action, although an explicit purpose to deny such cause of action would be
controlling."), with Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286 (requiring litigants to put forth evidence that
Congress affirmatively intended to create a private right of action).
209. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288 ("We therefore begin (and find that we can end) our
search for Congress’s intent with the text and structure of Title VI.").
210. Id.
211. See supra notes 194–201 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the Church
Amendment does not cleanly fit into the mold of either the "classic rights-creating" language
of Title VI or the purely funds-conditioning language of statutes like FERPA).
212. Compare Church Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c) (2006) (prohibiting
discriminatory conduct but failing to specifically authorize the withholding of funds in the
event of noncompliance), with Title VI § 602, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 ("Compliance with any
requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be effected by the termination of or refusal
to grant or to continue assistance under such program . . . ."), and FERPA, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232(g)(a) (2006) (providing that "[n]o funds shall be made available under any applicable
program" which fails to conform to the statute’s privacy requirements).
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construed in that way.213 Thus, there is considerable evidence that the
provision was not meant to operate in a funds-conditioning manner. If this
conclusion is read in conjunction with the decision reached by the court in
Cenzon-DeCarlo, we are left with a statute that facially prohibits
discrimination but which allows neither private enforcement nor
enforcement by means of conditioning the receipt of federal funding.214
This cannot be. It stretches the imagination to think that Congress intended
the Church Amendment to be a purely advisory statute.215
Because Congress’s intent cannot readily be distilled from the text and
structure of the Amendment, this is an appropriate instance to turn to
alternative means of determining intent. One of the most often considered
alternative sources of proof, suggested by Court precedent, is the
contemporary legal context in which the law was passed.216 This approach
acknowledges that Congress does not legislate in a vacuum but with an
awareness of judicial practices in play at the time.217 At the time the
213. See 119 CONG. REC. 9603 (1973) (statement of Sen. Church) (answering no to the
question of whether funding would be denied to non-compliant hospitals); id. (statement of
Senator Jackson) (same); id. (statement of Senator Javits) (answering the question as to
whether there was a penalty by responding that he hoped there would be but did not know if
it would be so construed in that way by the administrator).
214. See Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., No. 09 CV 3120(RJD), 2010 WL
169485, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010) (concluding that there was no possibility of private
enforcement under the Church Amendment); supra notes 211–13 and accompanying text
(demonstrating that the Church Amendment does not explicitly authorize conditioning the
receipt of federal funds on compliance); see also Rescission of the Bush Administration
Conscience Regulation, 74 Fed. Reg. 10,207, 10,209 (proposed Mar. 10, 2009) (to be
codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 88) ("No statutory provision requires the promulgation of rules to
implement the requirements of the Church Amendments . . . .").
215. See Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S.
CAL. L. REV. 289, 306 (1995) ("By definition, a right must be enforceable. What would be
the measure of a right whose transgression carried no penalty? It would look more like a
hope, or a request, than a guarantee.").
216. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 378
(1982) ("In determining whether a private cause of action is implicit in a federal statutory
scheme . . . the initial focus must be on the state of the law at the time the legislation was
enacted."); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 696 (1979) (considering the legal context
in conjunction with the text and legislative history and thereby concluding that Congress
intended for Title IX to be privately enforceable).
217. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 698 ("In sum, it is not only appropriate but also realistic
to presume that Congress was thoroughly familiar with these unusually important precedents
from this and other federal courts and that it expected its enactment to be interpreted in
conformity with them."); id. at 718 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("We do not write on an
entirely clean slate, however, and the Court’s opinion demonstrates that Congress . . . [had]
good reason to think that the federal judiciary would undertake this task [of implying a right
of action]."); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 313 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
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Church Amendment was passed, the federal courts were very active in
implying rights of action.218 It was not until after the Church Amendment’s
enactment in 1973 that the Court decided Cort v. Ash and introduced the
more restrictive approach to implying remedies.219 Therefore, any
determination of legislative intent regarding an implied right of action
under the Church Amendment must take into account how that Congress
understood the judicial approach to implication at the time.220 Because the
courts routinely implied remedies in the period prior to Cort v. Ash,
Congress’s silence concerning a remedy may well be the result of their
reliance on the courts to fashion a suitable private remedy.221
While a majority of the Court has recently expressed doubt as to the
viability of such contextual considerations, this view that context provides
an important tool for determining legislative intent garnered the support of
four dissenting justices in Sandoval.222 Even the majority in Sandoval
seems to concede that legal context is potentially relevant in a narrow class
of cases.223 The Church Amendment is such a case where legal context
attains this particular degree of relevance. It is unreasonable to expect the
Congress of 1973 to have explicitly considered the remedial effects of the
Church Amendment when the courts had not yet indicated that such explicit
consideration would be required to support a private remedy.224
("[The Court’s] unwillingness to even consider evidence as to the context in which Congress
legislated is perplexing. Congress does not legislate in a vacuum.").
218. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 698 ("[D]uring the period between the enactment of Title
VI in 1964 and the enactment of Title IX in 1972, this Court had consistently found implied
remedies—often in cases much less clear than this.").
219. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 85 (1975) (declining to imply a private right of
action under a federal criminal statute making it a crime for corporations to make
contributions or expenditures in connection with Presidential elections).
220. See Stabile, supra note 69, at 889–90 (saying that courts interpreting the
applicability of an implied right of action under an old statute must determine congressional
intent with reference to how that Congress likely understood implication).
221. See California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 299–300 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (concluding that Congress, aware of the courts’ common practice of implying
rights of action, expected that litigants "would have a remedy for any injury suffered by
reason of a violation of the new federal statute").
222. Compare Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288 ("[L]egal context matters only to the extent it
clarifies text."), with id. at 314 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Assuming, as we must, that
Congress was fully informed as to the state of the law, the contemporary context presents
important evidence as to Congress’ intent—evidence the majority declines to consider.").
223. See id. at 288 (majority opinion) (indicating that legal context may serve a
clarifying function in limited circumstances).
224. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 718 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)
(saying that the Court’s decision in Cannon, occurring six years after the passage of the
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Other than context, there are several other factors that weigh in favor
of finding a right of action under the Church Amendment. For instance, the
fact that the statute does not create any specific remedial scheme weighs in
favor of an implied remedy.225 When Congress creates a comprehensive
remedial scheme, the Court has treated that as an indication of
congressional intent to deny a right of action.226 Thus, where Congress has
not indicated a desire for the law to be enforced in another way, the
argument for implication is strengthened.227
Adding further support for a private remedy, the Obama administration
recently rolled back a HHS regulation aimed at protecting the conscience
rights of healthcare workers.228 At the end of the Bush Administration,
HHS issued a regulation establishing a complaint procedure for individuals,
like Cenzon-DeCarlo, who had faced discriminatory or coercive action by
entities receiving HHS funding.229 Furthermore, the regulation required
written certification by such entities that they would abide by federal law,
including the Church Amendment.230 Less than three months after it was
enacted, the Obama administration announced that it planned to rescind this
ruling.231 In so doing, HHS expressed its belief that the Church
Church Amendment, had put Congress on notice that with respect to private remedies the
"ball" was now "in its court").
225. See supra note 212 and accompanying text (noting that the Church Amendment
does not direct funds to be withheld from noncompliant entities); see also Church
Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (2006) (containing no remedial provisions).
226. See Karahalios v. Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps., 489 U.S. 527, 533 (1989) ("It is also
an ‘elemental canon’ of statutory construction that where a statute expressly provides a
remedy, courts must be especially reluctant to provide additional remedies." (citations
omitted)).
227. See Stabile, supra note 69, at 893–95 (suggesting that the lack of an explicit
remedial framework weighs in favor of implying a right of action); see also Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (articulating the factors that must be considered in deciding whether an
implied remedy is appropriate including whether it is "consistent with the underlying
purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff").
228. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 26 (1977) ("Once we identify the
legislative purpose, we must then determine whether the creation by judicial interpretation of
the implied cause of action asserted by Chris-Craft is necessary to effectuate Congress’
goals.").
229. See 45 C.F.R. § 88 (2008) (establishing a complaint and compliance certification
procedure to ensure that federal funds do not support discriminatory or coercive actions
towards individuals who refuse to perform services or research that they object to for
religious, moral, or ethical reasons).
230. See id. § 88.5 (requiring recipients of Health and Human Services funding to file a
Certificate of Compliance with the anti-discrimination provisions summarized in the HHS
regulation).
231. See Rescission of the Bush Administration Conscience Regulation, 74 Fed. Reg.
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Amendment did not require it to promulgate rules to implement the antidiscrimination provisions.232 In February of 2011, HHS announced its final
rule rescinding portions of the Bush Administration regulation. The new
rule cuts the compliance certification requirement and leaves only a
complaint procedure through the Office for Civil Rights (OCR).233 Given
OCR’s funding constraints and poor track record in the health care context,
this complaint procedure likely offers only illusory hopes of meaningful
recourse against discriminatory or coercive healthcare entities.234 The
absence of an effective administrative procedure to enforce the terms of the
Church Amendment further demonstrates that private enforcement is
necessary to achieve Congress’s goal of protecting the conscience rights of
healthcare workers.235

10,207, 10,210 (proposed Mar. 10, 2009) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 88) (announcing the
planned rescission of the Bush administration anti-discrimination regulation which had
established a complaint procedure and required recipients of HHS funds to certify their
compliance with conscience-protecting statutes such as the Church Amendment). A lawsuit
is currently pending in the district of Connecticut in which Connecticut is seeking to
invalidate the Bush era conscience regulation. Complaint at 6, Connecticut v. United States,
No. 3:09-cv-0054 (D. Conn. Jan. 15, 2009). The case was put on hold to give HHS time to
issue its final rulemaking, a rulemaking which could moot the case.
232. See Rescission of the Bush Administration Conscience Regulation, 74 Fed. Reg. at
10,209 ("No statutory provision requires the promulgation of rules to implement the
requirements of the Church Amendments . . . .").
233. See Regulation for the Enforcement of Federal Health Care Provider Conscience
Protection Laws, 76 Fed. Reg. 9,968, 9,976 (Feb. 23, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt.
88) ("The Office for Civil Rights (OCR) of the Department of Health and Human Services is
designated to receive complaints based on the Federal health care provider conscience
protection statutes.").
234. See Rose Cuison Villazor, Community Lawyering: An Approach to Addressing
Inequalities in Access to Health Care for Poor, of Color and Immigrant Communities, 8
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 35, 47 (2004–2005) ("OCR is severely under-funded and its
limited resources make it an ineffective governmental agency, not only for enforcing Title
VI but also for regulating our huge health care system."); Sara Rosenbaum & Joel
Teitelbaum, Civil Rights Enforcement in the Modern Healthcare System: Reinvigorating the
Role of the Federal Government in the Aftermath of Alexander v. Sandoval, 3 YALE J.
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 215, 230–32 (2003) (describing the failures of OCR and the
obstacles to its effective investigation of civil rights complaints).
235. See supra notes 196–201 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the intent of
Congress in drafting the Church Amendment was to protect individuals with a moral or
religious opposition to participating in abortions or sterilizations from discrimination in the
workplace).
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VIII. The Insufficiency of Other Possible Statutory Protections
Despite the various arguments favoring the implication of a private
remedy under the Church Amendment, it is far from certain that the courts
will respond favorably by allowing private enforcement. The most recent
Supreme Court cases lend credence to Justice Stevens’s suggestion that the
current Court has "distaste" for implied remedies in general.236 Due to the
very real possibility that no private remedy will be implied under the
Church Amendment and because of the great importance of the rights at
stake in Cenzon-DeCarlo, it may be necessary for Congress to revisit this
topic in order to make its purpose explicit. While there are currently
several federal laws that appear to forbid the kind of discriminatory
behavior described in Cenzon-DeCarlo, these statutes also fail to provide a
meaningful remedy to individuals like Mrs. Cenzon-DeCarlo who have
faced discrimination and coercion at the hands of a federally funded
hospital.237
The strongest language concerning an individual’s conscience rights in
the healthcare context comes from a provision of the National Research
Service Award Act of 1974.238 The relevant provision states:
No individual shall be required to perform or assist in the performance
of any part of a health service program or research activity funded in
whole or in part under a program administered by the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare [now Health and Human Services] if his
performance or assistance in the performance of such part of such
program or activity would be contrary to his religious beliefs or moral
convictions.239

Although this provision does not address discrimination, it provides
meaningful protection from coercion to perform acts contrary to one’s
religious beliefs or moral convictions. Furthermore, this provision contains
236. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 317 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(remarking that the Court’s unwillingness to expand the scope of the Title VI right of action
is rooted in a "profound distaste for implied causes of action" generally).
237. See generally Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447,
§ 508(d)(1)–(2), 118 Stat. 2809, 3163 (2004) [hereinafter Weldon Amendment]; 42 U.S.C.
§ 238n (2006) [hereinafter Coats Snowe Amendment].
238. See National Research Service Award Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348, § 214(d),
88 Stat. 342, 353 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(d) (2006)) (establishing
restrictions on the use of human subjects in research projects and including a provision
protecting individuals from requirements that they perform or assist in performing in any
"health services program or research activity" against their moral or religious beliefs).
239. Id.
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the "classic-rights creating language" that the courts have greatly favored in
the implied right of action context.240 Therefore, a litigant falling under the
scope of this statute would presumably face fewer obstacles in showing the
propriety of a right of action.241 The difficulty with this provision will be in
proving that the individual or the contested activity falls within the statute’s
scope.
This statute provides clear protection for an employee of a federally
administered health service program or research activity.242 It is less clear,
however, whether an employee of any institution that has received federal
funding from HHS is brought within the protection of the statute or whether
the individual must be working directly within a project specifically funded
by HHS. The indications given by the language, legislative history, and
limited case law suggest that there must be a close nexus between the
activity in question and the federal funding the institution has received.243
There is considerable doubt, for instance, whether a hospital’s receipt of a
grant for facility improvements would transform the entire hospital and all
of its employees into participants of a "health services program" for the
purposes of the statute. However, an employee conducting research under a
specified grant from HHS would present a clearer case for the statute’s

240. Compare id. (providing that "[n]o individual shall be required to perform or assist
in the performance . . . of such part of such program or activity [that] would be contrary to
his religious beliefs or moral convictions" (emphasis added)), with Title VI, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d ("No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
(emphasis added)).
241. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 287 (2002) (suggesting that a clear focus on
the individuals protected, as in Titles VI and IX, gives rise to the inference that Congress
intended to grant a private right on that class of persons).
242. See National Research Service Award Act of 1974 § 214(d) ("No individual shall
be required to perform or assist in the performance of any part of a health service program or
research activity funded in whole or in part under a program administered by the
Secretary . . . ."); S. REP. NO. 93-381, at 23 (1973) (saying that the conscience provision
"insures that no individual employed in a federally-funded health service program or
research activity covered by the provisions of the Act shall be required to take part in any
activity which would be contrary to his religious beliefs or moral conviction" (emphasis
added)).
243. See S. REP. NO. 93-381, at 24 (suggesting that the authoring committee had
employees of federally funded health programs and research activities in mind); see also
Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 590 (D.R.I. 1988) (rejecting a doctor’s claim that the
statute protected his refusal to remove the feeding tube of a patient on the request of the
family saying that the statute failed to reach the situation because the patient was not being
treated "through a ‘health service program’").
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applicability since those activities could be classified as a "project" funded
by HHS.244
Notwithstanding the statute’s possible limitations, the absence of
authoritative case law interpreting it suggests that it might be worth raising
in cases like Cenzon-DeCarlo’s where employees of federally funded
hospitals are required to perform activities against their religious or moral
belief. This is particularly true in cases where the patient or employee can
be traced to particular federal funding.245 It is not clear whether the patient
in Cenzon-DeCarlo was connected in that way to any particular federal
funding. Since this particular provision was not raised, it is unclear whether
the court would have been willing to adopt a more expansive reading of the
statute than the one taken earlier by the District of Rhode Island where it
was required that the patient be receiving treatment directly under a federal
health service program.246
Finally, this statute is further limited in effect because it only reaches
cases of coercion where individuals are required to perform or assist in an
activity against their religious or moral beliefs.247 Because it reaches only
these cases, its strong "rights-creating language" cannot be used to gain a
private remedy in cases where individuals have been discriminated against
because of their refusal to perform procedures against their religious or
moral beliefs. Thus, individuals with discrimination claims will still be
forced to litigate the implication question under the Church Amendment in
order to obtain a remedy. The statute is nonetheless an important federal
protection for individuals working under a federally funded project from
requirements that force them to violate their own conscience.248
244. See H. REP. NO. 93-1148, at 26 (Conf. Rep.) ("The Senate amendment contained
provisions which [] would prohibit an individual from being required to perform services or
research under projects funded by the Secretary . . . ." (emphasis added)).
245. See National Research Service Award Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348, § 214(d),
88 Stat. 342, 353 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(d) (2006)) (requiring that the
program or activity be funded "in whole or in part under a program administered by the
Secretary").
246. See Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 590 (rejecting a doctor’s claim of protection under 42
U.S.C. § 300a-7(d) because the patient was not receiving treatment under a "health service
program").
247. See 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(d) (2006) (protecting individuals working under federally
funded health programs or research activities from requirements that they perform
operations against their religious or moral beliefs).
248. See Irene Prior Loftus, I Have a Conscience Too: The Plight of Medical
Personnel Confronting the Right to Die, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 727 (1990)
(suggesting that 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(d) might be effective in protecting the rights of
healthcare workers in cases where the stipulated federal funds are involved).
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Perhaps the most well known federal statutory provision related to the
conscience rights of healthcare workers is the Weldon Amendment.249 This
amendment prohibits the funding of any federal or state government or
agency that subjects individuals or institutions to discrimination on the
basis of a refusal to "provide, pay for, provide coverage of, or refer
abortions."250 While it establishes an important principal that federal
funding should not be extended to entities that discriminate against the
conscience rights of healthcare workers, it does not directly address the
discriminatory actions themselves. Rather, Weldon is phrased in terms of a
condition for the receipt of funding.251 Furthermore, this amendment is
directed at discrimination by federal or state governments, programs, and
agencies and, therefore, does not reach nongovernmental healthcare
providers such as federally funded, private hospitals.252 Since the language
of the statute is purely funds-conditioning and since the statute was passed
long after the Supreme Court embraced a limited role in implying rights of
action, there is far less justification for a private remedy under Weldon than
under the Church Amendment.253
The Coats-Snowe Amendment254 is another prominent federal
statutory provision aimed at reducing discrimination towards entities that
refuse to provide, cover, or refer abortions. However, like the Weldon
Amendment, Coats-Snowe does not reach discrimination carried out by
nongovernmental hospitals, clinics, or research institutions receiving
249. See Weldon Amendment, Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 508(d)(1)–(2), 118 Stat. 2809,
3163 (2004) (providing that no funds would be made available to state or federal agencies,
programs, or government if it "subjects any institutional or individual healthcare entity to
discrimination on the basis that the health care entity does not provide, pay for, provide
coverage of, or refer for abortions").
250. Id. § 508(d)(1).
251. See id. (conditioning the receipt of federal funds by saying "[n]one of the funds
made available in this Act may be made available to a Federal agency or program . . ." that
discriminates).
252. See id. § 508(d)(1)–(2) (applying conditions on the receipt of federal funds to
government agencies and programs while making no mention of private institutions).
253. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 287 (2002) (finding that the pure fundsconditioning language of FERPA provided no suggestion that Congress intended to confer a
right upon an identifiable class of individuals); see also Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S.
275, 289 (2001) ("Statutes that focus on the person regulated rather than the individuals
protected create ‘no implication of an intent to confer rights on a particular class of
persons.’" (quoting California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 294 (1981)).
254. See Coats Snowe Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 238n (2006) (providing that the federal
government, as well as any state governments receiving federal financial assistance, may not
discriminate against a health care entity on the basis of their refusal to train in, perform, or
refer abortions).
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federal funding. By its terms, Coats-Snowe is directed at the federal, state,
and local governments that receive federal financial assistance.255 This
provision is then without effect in cases like Cenzon-DeCarlo where the
discriminatory actions are carried out by a private hospital that receives
federal funding. Furthermore, even in a case where an individual faced
discrimination at the hands of federal or state government because of their
refusal to provide abortion services, Court precedent will likely foreclose
private enforcement. Although the possibility of a private right of action
would turn on an application of § 1983, the Court’s decision in Gonzaga
suggests that no privately enforceable right would be found under CoatsSnowe.256
Added to the lack of a federal judicial remedy for abortion-related
coercion and discrimination is the apparent absence of administrative
relief.257 The recent enactment and subsequent repeal of the compliance
certification procedure has generated a great deal of uncertainty regarding
the limits of conscience protections for healthcare workers.258 What is
certain, however, is that this likely repeal leaves individuals who have faced
such discrimination and coercion with no means of assuring that such
events will not occur again in the future. Furthermore, the back and forth of
HHS demonstrates the inherent insufficiency of administrative remedies in
the conscience context. Because of the divisive nature of abortion related
issues and the lack of clarity concerning Congress’s intended means of
enforcing the Church Amendment, an administrative remedy will only be
effective to the extent that each administration is committed to the
protection of conscience rights.
In the midst of the recent debate concerning healthcare reform, the
issue of an individual’s right to be free from coercion and discrimination
relating to their views on abortion once again came to the surface.259
255. See id. ("The Federal Government, and any State or local government that receives
Federal financial assistance, may not subject any health care entity to discrimination . . . .").
256. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 287 (suggesting that the lack of Title VI and IX’s rightscreating language creates a strong presumption against finding that Congress intended to
create a right for an identifiable class of individuals).
257. See Rescission of the Bush Administration Conscience Regulation, 74 Fed. Reg.
10,207, 10,209 (proposed Mar. 10, 2009) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 88) ("No statutory
provision requires the promulgation of rules to implement the requirements of the Church
Amendments . . . .").
258. See supra notes 229–34 and accompanying text (detailing the enactment and
repeal of the Bush administration conscience-protection regulation).
259. See 150 CONG. REC. S12,629 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2009) (amendment offered by Sen.
Coburn) (proposing an amendment to the Senate Health Bill that prohibits discrimination by
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Various provisions attempting to protect conscience rights were proposed
and considered.260 The debate over healthcare presented yet another missed
opportunity for Congress to fortify individual conscience protections. One
proposal by Senator Coburn echoed some of the language of the Church
Amendment but went further by establishing a complaint procedure through
the Office of Civil Rights.261 This proposal, as was the case with the others,
was unsuccessful.262 However, the fact that such a provision would even be
deemed necessary lends credence to the argument that the Church
Amendment has failed to satisfy its essential purposes. Furthermore, while
a complaint procedure through OCR, like the one proposed by Senator
Coburn, is better than nothing, still more is needed.263 Congress should
seize this opportunity, with healthcare on the forefront of the American
consciousness, to fortify conscience protections by empowering individuals
to pursue their own remedies in federal court against federally funded
entities that use coercive or discriminatory measures in an attempt to
undermine the individual’s religious or moral objections to participation in
abortion procedures.
IX. Conclusion
The dismissal of Cenzon-DeCarlo’s claim, in conjunction with the
enactment and subsequent rescission of the HHS regulation, casts an
unacceptable level of doubt upon the extent of an individual’s conscience
rights in the health care context. Presently, it is unclear whether an
individual who refuses to perform or assist in the performance of abortions
has a legally enforceable right to be free from discrimination and coercion
at the hands of institutions empowered by federal funding. This state of
recipients of funding under the Act against individual health care providers or institutions on
the basis that they refuse to provide, provide coverage for, or refer abortions).
260. See, e.g., id. (showing one example of a conscience provision being offered as an
amendment to the health bill).
261. See id. ("The Office for Civil Rights of the Department of Health and Human
Services is designated to receive complaints of discrimination based on this section, and
coordinate the investigation of such complaints.").
262. See id. (showing that Sen. Coburn’s proposed amendment that prohibited
discrimination was tabled).
263. Cf. Melody Harris, Hitting ’Em Where It Hurts: Using Title IX Litigation to Bring
Gender Equity to Athletics, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 57, 95 (1994) (discussing the failure of the
Office of Civil Rights within the Department of Education to enforce the provisions of Title
IX and the fact that OCR had never withdrawn funds from noncompliant educational
institutions).
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confusion leaves open the possibility that an individual could be without a
defense against entities that force him or her to perform or assist in the
performance of a procedure that fundamentally violates his or her
conscientious, moral, or religious beliefs. As was noted by one of the
Senators who passed the Church amendment, such a notion "is repugnant to
our political traditions."264 This principle that a person should not be
compelled to violate their fervently held beliefs is reflected in numerous
statutory provisions that prohibit such coercion and discrimination.265
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has made clear that its decisions relating to
abortion and contraception do not establish a constitutional right of access
and that conscience clauses are appropriate means of protecting individuals
and institutions who object to participation.266 However, to wait in hope
that the Court will one day recognize the importance of a private right of
action under the Church Amendment would be ill-advised. In the
meantime, a cloud of uncertainty, stirred up by the Cenzon-DeCarlo case,
would loom in the minds of healthcare workers all across the United States.
It is time, therefore, for Congress to move these various statutory provisions
and statements of policy beyond the level of mere rhetoric by explicitly
empowering individuals like Catherine Cenzon-DeCarlo to pursue a remedy
against federally funded entities that employ discriminatory policies and
practices against conscientious, religious, and moral objectors to
participating in abortions.

264. 119 CONG. REC. 9,601 (1973) (statement of Sen. Buckley).
265. See supra notes 43–53 and accompanying text (discussing the protections provided
by the Church Amendment); supra notes 249–56 and accompanying text (addressing
Congress’s attempt in passing the Coats-Snowe and Weldon Amendments to prevent
discrimination against individuals who, for religious or moral reasons, refuse to perform,
provide coverage for, or refer for elective abortions).
266. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Limits of Conscience: Moral Clashes over
Deeply Divisive Healthcare Procedures, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 41, 54 (2008) ("[T]he U.S.
Supreme Court on multiple occasions has made clear that Griswold and Roe established only
negative rights to be free from government interference, not positive rights to the assistance
of others."); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 198 (1973) (suggesting that conscience clauses
"afford appropriate protection to the individual and to denominational hospital"); Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (explaining that the rights recognized in Roe related to the
freedom from government interference but such a right does not require the government to
remove "obstacles . . . not of its own creation").

